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Introduction
This article considers two legal cases and the stories that
developed around them. Both the cases and their stories involved
issues of significance to the larger society - death and bias. Each
concern has occasioned confusion and debate in its own right. When
these issues are combined, confusion and debate are intensified. This
Article examines the complicated interplay between bias and
decisions about death and dying in the U.S. health care system.
Further, it reviews intersecting claims about the importance,
respectively, of autonomy and community in resolving disputes about
the topics of death and dying.
Litigation can be lost or won on the basis of the underlying
narrative reported to a court. When that narrative involves matters of
interest to the public (as the two cases examined in this article do), it
attracts the attention of public media. Media often embellishes upon
legal narratives, offering stories that carry public messages. This
article focuses on two such stories - that of Elizabeth BouviaI who
sought the right to die with hospital assistance in the 1980s, and that
of Jahi McMath, 2 for whom a tonsillectomy, performed in 2013, led
to a brain death diagnosis, and whose family refused to accept that
diagnosis. These stories were separated in time by over three decades.
Yet, each bears important similarities with one another-each
involved bias. In the case of Bouvia, born with cerebral palsy, that
3
bias reflected presumptions about people with disabilities. And in
the case of McMath, an African American adolescent, bias reflected
presumptions about race.4 Moreover, both Bouvia and McMath (or
more accurately, perhaps, McMath's family) attracted media
attention, further exacerbated when both cases were selected for
review by courts in California. 5

1
2
2016).
3
4

5

Bouvia v. Superior Ct., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986).
McMath v. California, No. 15-Cv-06042-HSG, 2016 WL 7188019 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12,
See generallyBouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127.
See generally McMath, 2016 WL 7188019.
McMath, 2016 WL 7188019, at *1; Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127.
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The next part of this article introduces the complicated array of
issues occasioned by Elizabeth Bouvia and Jahi McMath's respective
legal cases, and it begins to present the encompassing social stories
of both Bouvia and McMath. Part III then reviews Bouvia's legal
cases and her story in detail, focusing first, in Section A, on the court
cases, and then, in Section B, on Bouvia's personal story. Part IV then
reviews the legal cases involving Jahi McMath and public stories
about her and her family. Section A of Part IV reviews relevant legal
cases. Section B focuses on the notion of brain death. It aims to
suggest the parameters and complex implications of a brain death
diagnosis. Section C examines Jahi's personal and family stories. Part
V reflects on the ideological context within which each case and its
encompassing story developed the presentation of those stories in
public media and the shifts in the public lenses through which each
case was viewed by the larger society.
I.

What Was at Stake: Death, Dying, Personhood, and
Bias

Both the story of Bouvia and that of McMath frame the potential

impact that bias and prejudice have on cases involving death and dying.
Each reveals the significance that a party's personal and familial stories

provide for the public's understanding of, and responses to, legal
proceedings. For example, in Elizabeth Bouvia's story - a young woman

sought the right to die because, as she framed the case, she could not live
with her physical disabilities. 6 However, once granted the right to die,
Bouvia decided, instead, to live. 7 In Jahi McMath's story, a black
adolescent's family resisted the determinations of doctors and judges,
who had ultimately concluded that the girl was brain dead.8 As a result
of the family's efforts, the girl received ventilatory support and,
eventually, nutritional support. Whether Jahi was brain dead or not

depended on the lens through which one examines the nuances of brain
death diagnoses. 9

6
?

See Bouvia, 179 Cal. App.3d 1127.
See id.
8 See McMath, 2016 WL 7188019 at *4.
9 See id. at *4.
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The specifics of each case differ significantly from one another.
Bouvia wanted to die; 10 McMath's family wanted her to live."
Bouvia lived with other people (in hospital facilities) but was not
interested in communal engagement. 12 She depended on claims of
privacy and autonomy in her pleas to public media and in court
cases. 13 In comparison, McMath's pro-active, committed family
supported her, working together through each stage of the quest to
keep McMath on life-sustaining care.14 Each story suggests the role
underlying biases in judicial and medical assumptions about
personhood and, correlatively, in understandings of death and
dying. 15 More specifically, each story shows the role bias and
prejudice play in limiting healthcare options and in guiding judicial
responses to disputed choices about death and dying. 16 Further, media
reports on the issues and people involved in each case reached broad
audiences and affected the national debate surrounding death and
dying.' 7
Both stories depended on narratives about young females: in one
case a young woman, in the other, an adolescent in need of rescue
from medicine and/or law. Bouvia's rescue story focused on
Elizabeth, herself - a woman in her twenties, presumed to be seeking
relief from disabilities and from a medical system that insisted on
8
treating her despite her wish to starve to death.1 McMath's rescue
story focused on Jahi, whose family members insisted to clinicians,
to state judges, and to federal judges that the girl was not dead. Jahi's
family prevailed through unrelenting insistence in having Jahi's life10

13
14

See Bouvia, 179 Cal. App.3d 1127.
See McMath, 2016 WL 7188019.
See Bouvia, 179 Cal. App.3d 1127.
See id.
See McMath, 2016 WL 7188019.

1s

See id.

1

12

16

Importantly, that guidance is often not conscious; see, e.g., Mahzarin R. Banaji,
Blindspot: Hidden Biases of GoodPeople (2016).
17 Bouvia's story occurred before public media relied on the internet, and thus, almost
certainly reached a smaller audience than did McMath's story. A search in Lexis+ (July 21, 2021)
identified 555 news stories and 144 legal articles (for the search Elizabeth /3 Bouvia AND (death
OR dying)); A Lexis+ search (July 15, 2018) for "Jahi McMath" AND brain /5 (dead OR death)
identified over 2,000 news stories and over 42 articles in "Secondary Materials" that mentioned
or discussed Jahi McMath's story.
18 See Bouvia, 179 Cal. App.3d 1127.

&

66

QUINNIPIAC HEALTH LAW

[Vol. 25:1

support sustained until she succumbed to a cardio-pulmonary death
in 2018, over four years after she was declared brain dead. 19
Although each case reflects biases, 2 0 the implications of those
biases and the frameworks within which they operated differ between
the two stories. A California appellate court granted Elizabeth Bouvia
the right to be free from feeding through a nasogastric tube and to
remain in a public hospital. 2 1 The operative paradigm employed by
the court that granted Elizabeth's request was that of autonomous
individuality. The California appellate court that entertained the case
contrasted with the state trial court which had reviewed an earlier,
though similar, petition submitted by Bouvia. 22 The trial court denied
Elizabeth the right to starve to death in a public hospital. 23 The
appellate court (in a separate action brought three years later)
assumed that Elizabeth's choice made preeminent sense. 2 4 That
assumption was based on the court's perspective regarding
Elizabeth's everyday life. The court saw her as devastatingly limited
in her life and it saw her options in life as consistently grim. In the
court's view, Elizabeth's physical limitations severely restricted her
opportunities to thrive and definitively precluded a full and desirable
life in the present and the future. 2 5 Thus, the court concluded that
Elizabeth's preference for death over life was entirely reasonable.26
In contrast, the case of Jahi McMath, the adolescent girl declared
brain dead but whose family insisted she was not dead, reflected the
force of communal activism. 27 Jahi's autonomous individuality was
not invoked by the courts that considered her situation. In part, this
reflects Jahi's age; she was a child in the eyes of the law. It also

19 See id.
20 See id.
21 See id.
22 See John H. Hews, Bouvia v. Riverside, Trial Court DecisionIn Bouvia I, 1 Issues L.
MED. 485 (1986); John H. Hews, Bouvia v. Riverside, Trial CourtDecision In Bouvia II, 1 Issues
L. & MED. 493 (1986).
23 See id. at 490.
24 See id at 1145 (The court committed itself to providing a justification for Bouvia's
decision).
25 See Paul K. Longmore, Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide andSocial Prejudice,3 Issues
L. & MED. 167 (1987) [hereinafter Longmore, Assisted Suicide].
26 See Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. at 1145.
27

See id
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reflects Jahi's inability to have made medical decisions because she
had lost - depending on perspective - all or much of her pre-surgical
brain function. Even more, Jahi's family members, who resisted the
brain death diagnosis given to the girl, presented themselves as a
cohesive and competent community. The familial community was
reinforced by active support from church groups and friends of Jahi's
family members.
Legal proceedings in Jahi McMath's case do not reflect bias as
transparently as do proceedings in the case of Elizabeth Bouvia.
However, the family, which never succeeded in their efforts to have
the courts order a revision of Jahi's California death certificate
achieved a practical victory early on by gaining access to the child's
body. In doing so, they were able to move Jahi to New Jersey where
28
a brain death diagnosis was not necessarily determinative of death.
That victory reflects the commitment of Jahi's family - especially her
mother, grandmother, uncle, and step-father - as well as that of her
larger community, who prevented the hospital in which Jahi had been
declared brain dead from withdrawing the tubes that allowed the girl
to continue breathing and, later, to provide for Jahi to receive assisted
hydration and nutrition. 2 9 The two cases present a sharp contrast
between rights grounded on the presumption of autonomous
individuality and the protections (often social as much as legal) that
can come from a supportive community.
II.

Elizabeth Bouvia: Competing Narratives

The California appellate court that granted Bouvia the right to be
cared for in a public hospital-while she refused nutrition and
30
hydration-constructed one vision of Bouvia's life. It is a grim
vision that encouraged the court to conclude that Bouvia's request to
have hospital clinicians assist with her effort to die reflected the most
rational response to a life with severe disabilities.31

28 See Winkfield v. Children's Hosp. Oakland, No. 4:13-cv-05993-SBA, 2016 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 8560, at *3-*4, (N.D. Cal. Jan 23, 2014).
29 See id.
30 See Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. at 1147.
3' See id.
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The court did not leave room for alternative descriptions and
explanations of Elizabeth Bouvia's situation. In fact, there are
contrasting visions of Bouvia's life. Had the court attended to
alternative understandings of Bouvia's situation, it would likely have
re-shaped its reasoning, if not its holding. 3 2 Several scholars and
journalists belied the court's depiction of Bouvia's opportunities in
life with the suggestion that that depiction flowed from a biased view
of a life with disabilities. This part first considers the decisions
rendered in two cases, each initiated by Bouvia. The first case,
decided in 1983, held against Bouvia, denying her the right she
sought. But in 1986, a California appellate court granted her that
right. Each court opinion framed the court's conclusions in light of
the judge's own vision of Bouvia's life and of her potential to enjoy
that life. 33
a. Elizabeth Bouvia: The Legal Case
In the early 1980s, Elizabeth Bouvia sought legal assistance in
order to gain the right to die. 34 At the time, Bouvia was living at a
public hospital in Riverside County in California. 3 5 Bouvia was
determined to stop eating and drinking; she explained that her life had
become unbearable to her. 36 However, physicians at Riverside
determined that clinicians would insert a nasogastric tube once
Elizabeth's body weight fell below a set threshold. The tube, they
explained, was necessary to "[keep] her alive through involuntary
forced feeding." 37 The case raised novel questions. Barbara Miliken,
an attorney for the hospital, reported that she was unable to find case

32 Ms. B v. An NHS Hosp. Trust, All ER (D)362, 449, para 95 (Mar. 22, 2002). (The court
held for Ms. B and then declared: "I hope she will forgive me for saying, diffidently, that if she
did reconsider her decision, she would have a lot to offer the community at large.").
33 See Longmore, Assisted Suicide, supra note 25, at 150.
34 See Bouvia I, supra note 22, at 485; Bouvia II, supra note 22.
See also Rev. Robert Barry, The Elizabeth Bouvia Case: Legalizing Euthanasia by Lethal
Injection, 53 THE LINACRE QUARTERLY, 13 (1986).
35 See Bouvia I, supra note 22, at 488.
36 Id
37

Bouvia, 179 Cal. at 1145.
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law involving a patient requesting the right to stay in a public hospital
38
while refusing assisted nutrition and hydration.
Bouvia's attorneys arranged for psychiatric evaluations of their
client. 39 They engaged three psychiatric professionals-none with
expertise in helping people with disabilities-who concluded that
Elizabeth's desire to die was grounded only in her response to her
disabilities, not society's failure to accommodate her or the series of
life events that would have depressed most people. 40 In their view,
her response was rational. 4 1 But in the view of many disability rights
42
Paul
activists, this reflected prejudice against disabled people.
Longmore, in a lengthy review of Bouvia's story, concluded that
Bouvia suffered from depression, which he ascribed not to Bouvia's
disabilities, but to society's failure to accommodate people with
disabilities.43
A California trial court refused Bouvia's request for an injunction.
The injunction would have precluded the hospital from insisting that
Bouvia receive nutrition and hydration through the use of a
nasogastric tube or comparable device or procedure.44 The trial court
framed the issue in light of Bouvia's request for assistance in dying.
The court wondered "whether or not a severely handicapped,
mentally competent person who is otherwise physically healthy and
not terminally ill has the right to end her life with the assistance of
society." 45
Basing its decision "entirely upon the constitutional issue
presented," the court determined that the right Bouvia sought was not
extended to her by the law. 4 6 The constitutional issue at stake, the
court explained, concerned "the unwritten right of privacy and selfdetermination recognized under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and

38 Mary Johnson, Right to Life, Fightto Die: The Elizabeth Bouvia Saga, ELECTRIC EDGE
(1997), https://www3.dbu.edu/jeanhumphreys/DeathDying/Bouvia.htm.
39 See Longmore, Assisted Suicide, supra note 25, at 156.
40 Id. at 157.
41 Id.
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 Bouvia I, supra note 22, at 485.
45 Id. at 489
46

Id.
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Fourteenth Amendments to the United State Constitution ... .47 More
specifically, the court concluded that in light of Bouvia's situation,
any right she might claim she had to terminate her life was "overcome
by the strong interests of the State and society." 4 8
That the preservation of life is the strongest state interest
involved. That our society values life. That Bouvia is not
terminal and her life will be preserved. That none of the parties
have cited any legal precedent which approves the proposition
that a non-terminal person with the life 15 to 20 years who has a
disabling but non-progressive physical condition should be
allowed to terminate life because of a sincere desire to do so by
reason of the disability. 4 9

Judge Hews, who presided in Bouvia's 1983 case, concluded his
"Statement of Decision" by suggesting that Bouvia should "realize
that there is hope in life and that now, because of the action by her,
she can be a symbol of hope to others similarly situated if she changes
her purpose." 5 0 The message, though presumably positive, suggests
that Bouvia could find meaning in life only through effecting a heroic
response - that, in effect, Bouvia could choose to be an object of pity
(a position reflected openly in the decision of a state appellate court
three years later) or a courageous "symbol of hope." 5 1 In short, the
court characterized Elizabeth Bouvia as either pitiable or heroic in the
face of what the court imagined to be a terrible plight. Bouvia initiated
an appeal but later dropped it.5 2
Three years later, Bouvia sought court assistance for a second
time, requesting the right to stay in a public hospital and to have a
nasogastric feeding tube withdrawn and not re-inserted. Judge Beach
for the California appellate court granted Bouvia the right she
sought.53 The appellate court focused on protecting Bouvia's right to
autonomous decision-making concerning medical care. To justify its
47
48
49
50

51

Id

Id
Id

Id. at 491.
Id.

52 See Belinda Stradley, Elizabeth Bouvia v. Riverside Hospital: Suicide,
Euthanasia,
Murder: The Line Blurs, 15 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 407, 408 (1985).
53 See Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. at 1146.
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decision, the court displayed and re-enforced negative stereotypes of
people with disabilities. 54 Near the start of his opinion, Judge Beach
characterized what he viewed to have been the trial court's conceptual
mistake:
By refusing petitioner the relief which she sought, the trial
court, with the most noble intentions, attempted to exercise its
discretion by issuing a ruling which would uphold what it
considered a lawful object, i.e., keeping Elizabeth Bouvia alive
by a means which it considered ethical. Nonetheless, it erred for
it had no discretion to exercise. Petitioner sought to enforce only
a right which was exclusively hers and over which neither the
medical profession nor the judiciary have any veto power. The
trial court could but recognize and protect her exercise of that

right."
The court grounded that conclusion on a privacy right that
incorporates "[t]he right to refuse medical treatment." That
conclusion assumes that the provision of nutrition and hydration is
part of a patient's medical treatment.5 6 The appellate court might
seem to have been grounded on respect for Bouvia's personhood and
her right to make her own medical decisions. However, the language
through which the court supported and explained its decision
reflected a deeply biased understanding of Bouvia's disabilities and
of disabilities more generally. 57
Judge Beach constructed a narrative of Bouvia's life that, in his
58
view, justified a preference for death over life. The court contended
that the trial court had erred in focusing on the length of time Bouvia
would likely live if treated (15 to 20 years) rather than on the
presumed "quality" of Bouvia's life - a matter, in the court's opinion,

54

See id.

55 Id. at 1135.
See Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. at 1141 (noting that in March of 1986 the Council on Ethical
56
and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association opined that "[1]ife prolonging medical
treatment includes medication and artificially or technologically supplied respiration, nutrition or
hydration.").
5? See generally id.
58 See id. at 1145.
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of more significance than the expected quantity of her life. 59 The
court explained that determination:
[I]f force fed, petitioner faces 15 to 20 years of a painful
existence ... Her mind and spirit may be free to take great flights
but she herself is imprisoned and must lie physically helpless
subject to the ignominy, embarrassment, humiliation and
dehumanizing aspects created by her helplessness . . . It is
incongruous, if not monstrous, for medical practitioners to assert
their right to preserve a life that someone else must live, or, more
accurately, endure ... 60

The court assumed that the quantity of Bouvia's life paled in the
face of its quality. Bouvia agreed.
In Elizabeth Bouvia's view, the quality of her life has been
diminished to the point of hopelessness, uselessness,
unenjoyability and frustration. She, as the patient, lying
helplessly in bed, unable to care for herself, may consider her
existence meaningless. She cannot be faulted for so concluding.
If her right to choose may not be exercised because there remains
to her, in the opinion of a court, a physician or some committee,
a certain arbitrary number of years, months, or days, her right
will have lost its value and meaning. Who shall say what the
minimum amount of available life must be? Does it matter if it
be 15 to 20 years, 15 to 20 months, or 15 to 20 days if such a life
has been physically destroyed and its quality, dignity and
purpose gone? 6 1

In effect, Judge Beach grounded the decision on his sense that
Bouvia's disabilities rendered her life unbearable and that those
disabilities would render almost anyone's life unbearable. Thus, for
Bouvia to die seemed to be a reasonable option. These conclusions
harmonized with the growing emphasis in the second half of the
twentieth century on the significance of autonomous individuality in
a variety of contexts, 62 including that of medical decision-making. By

59

Id. at 1142.
Id. at 1143.
61 Id. at 1142-43.
62 See Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition:From Griswoldto Eisenstadt
andBeyond,
82 GEo. L.J. 1519, 1532 (1994). The domain of health care-in particular, the physician-patient
60
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understanding Bouvia's life as unbearable, the court was able to
explain the concrete decision in requiring the hospital to abide by
Bouvia's wish to terminate nutrition and hydration.
Even more strikingly, the concurrence by Lynn Compton
identified one of the "tragedies" of the case to have been the lengths
to which Bouvia was compelled to go to gain "relief from her

suffering." 63
Fate has dealt this young woman a terrible hand. Can anyone
blame her if she wants to fold her cards and say "I am out?" Yet
medical personnel who have had charge of her case have
attempted to force Elizabeth to continue in the game. In their
64
efforts they have been abetted by two different trial courts.

Later, Compton asserted that he identified with Bouvia's
responses, that it was better to die than to continue living as Bouvia
lived.65
Importantly, Bouvia's attorneys presented a dismal portrait of
her life and her future. Similar to the appellate court judge, Richard
Scott6 6 and other lawyers who participated in Bouvia's
68
representation 6 7 painted Bouvia as hopeless and helpless.
6 9 explained
Scott, one of the founders of the Hemlock Society,
while he was representing Bouvia, his client was "a tragically
relationship-was similarly reshaped in the last half of the twentieth century by a call for patient
autonomy and a diminution of physician authority in choosing among medical options.
63 Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. at 1146 (Compton, A., concurring).
64

Id.

65 Mike McKee, Does Suicide Ever Make Sense: Some Doctorsfor the Terminally Ill Say
Yes, but Not Everyone in the Medical Community Thinks It's Clear When a Patient's Choice to
Die Is Rational, THE RECORDER, p. 1 (Jan. 12, 1994).
66 See Burt A. Folkart, Richard S. Scott: Argued Right-to-Die Cases, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15,
(Scott
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1992-08-15-mn-4791-story.html
1992),
committed suicide in 1992. Scott's wife told the media that her husband had "battled depression
most of his life and 'some of the events in his practice (of dealing with the critically ill) had a
strong bearing on his feelings."').
67 See Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. at 1133 (In addition to Richard Scott, Bouvia's attorneys,
included Jacqueline Scheck, Griffith Thomas, Paul Hoffman, and Andrew Roth).
68 Paul K. Longmore, Urging the Handicapped to Die: Bouvia Decision Is Victory for
Bigotry, Not Self-Determination, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 1986), https://www.latimes.com/archives
/la-xpm-1986-04-25-me-l 395-story.html [hereinafter Longmore, Urgingthe Handicapped].
69 Derek Humphry, Let Me Die Before I Wake: Hemlock's Book of Self-deliverancefor the
Dying (Dell Publishing et al. eds., 1st ed. 1984); Patients Rights Council, AssistedSuicide & Death
with Dignity: Past, Present & Future- Part I (2013), https://www.patientsrightscouncil.org/site
/rpt2005-partI/.
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developmentally disabled person. She has come to realize she is
completely unemployable." 70 That view of Bouvia was readily
appropriated by the court. Yet, other views were soon voiced in other
settings, especially within the disability rights community. Paul
Longmore, a disability rights advocate, characterized the court's
decision to reject Bouvia's request to discontinue assisted nutrition
and hydration to have been "pervaded with ignorance and bias." 7 1
b. Bouvia: A Life Story
In 1987, a year after the California appellate court rendered its
decision in Bouvia v. Superior Court,7 2 Paul Longmore 73 narrated
Bouvia's story within a framework intended to advance social
understanding of biases against people with disabilities. 74
Longmore's article was particularly critical of Judge Beach's 1986
decision that granted Bouvia the right to starve to death.75 Longmore
claimed that the court had "in effect, granted [Bouvia] a right to a
judicially sanctioned, medically assisted suicide." 76 Further,
Longmore characterized the court's opinion as "pervaded with
ignorance and bias - thus rendering it "typical of discussions
regarding disabled people and the right to die." 77
In describing the suffering that Bouvia endured, the court
explained that she had "degenerative and severely crippling

70

71

Johnson, supra note 38, at 3.
Longmore, Assisted Suicide, supra note 25, at 157; Paul K. Longmore, Famous (and

not-so-famous) People with Disabilities, DISABILITY SOCIAL HISTORY PROJECT (Sep. 15, 2010),

http://www.disabilityhistory.org/people longmore.htm- [hereinafter Longmore, Famous]. When
the California appellate court decision in Bouvia was handed down (1986), assisted suicide was
not legal anywhere in the United States. Its legalization, beginning in Oregon in 1994, would not
have helped Bouvia. In states that have legalized assisted suicide, its use has been reserved for
people with terminal illnesses and has been precluded for people with disabilities and not
presumed likely soon to die. See, e.g., Oregon Death with Dignity Act. § 127. 800 (2021).
72 See generally Bouvia, 179 Cal. App.
73 See Longmore, Assisted Suicide, supra note 25.
74 See id. at 141.
75 See generally Bouvia, 179 Cal. App.
76 Longmore, Assisted Suicide, supra note, 25 at 157. The Oregon Death
with Dignity Act,
passed through a ballot initiative, provides for physicians to assist patients in hastening death. See
Janet Dolgin & Lois Shepherd, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW, 533-39 (4th ed. 2019).
77 Longmore, Assisted Suicide, supra note 25, at 157.
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arthritis." 7 8 Longmore offered a correction: Bouvia had not, in fact,
ever been diagnosed with arthritis. 79 Similarly, the court described
Bouvia to have suffered from "severe cerebral palsy" which had
80
"progressed to the point where she is completely bedridden."
Longmore countered that "cerebral palsy ... is not a progressive
condition." 8 1 Perhaps, most stunning, Longmore corrected the court's
presumption that Bouvia would never be able to get out of bed. In
fact, Longmore reported Bouvia had long been depressed, and that
that depression, not physical disabilities, accounted for her inability
to get out of bed. 82
83
Longmore described Bouvia's own attorneys to have based their
presentation of her case to the court on distressing images of
disability. These images facilitated the court's pitying Bouvia for a
life with disabilities and concluding that her preference for death over
life was reasonable in light of her presumptive physical limitations.
The court asserted,
"She lays flat in bed and must do so the rest of her life." Her
lawyers have assiduously propagated this distortion of the reality
of her disability. In fact, she was never bedridden until four years
ago, when, in her depressed state, she refused to get out of bed.
She has been allowed to languish there ever since. When this
case began, her lawyers told the court and the public that she
required constant care. In fact, her in-home aides were never on
duty more than six hours a day. 84

Bouvia's personal history did not commence her opposition to the
85
care she received in California public hospitals . Throughout the
early years of her life, Bouvia suffered more from what Mary Johnson
has called a "disabling environment" than from physical
disabilities. 86 Bouvia's family, the schools she attended, and
78 Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. at 1136.
79 Longmore, Assisted Suicide, supra note 25, at 157.
80 Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. at 1135-36.
81 Longmore, Assisted Suicide, supra note 25, at 157.
82 See id.
83 See id. at 162.
84 Id. at 157.
85 Id.
86 Id.
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eventually, she, herself, internalized society's most negative
"construct of 'disability."' 87 More specifically, "[p]eople never
considered that the problems Bouvia faced might stem from an
unadapted environment; that if her environment would change, her
problems might lessen." 8 8
Elizabeth Bouvia's childhood relationships with close family
seem to have been unfulfilling. When she was a young child, her
parents separated and then divorced.89 Her father, Ren Castner,
moved away. 90 Five years later, Elizabeth's mother remarried and
placed Elizabeth, then aged 10, in the Angel View Crippled
Children's Foundation home in Desert Hot Springs, California. 9 1
Between that time and her 1 8 th birthday, she visited with her mother
only two times. 9 2 At 18, she was released from the facility, and aides,
paid for by a California state program, 93 assisted Elizabeth with the
activities of daily life. 94
Without familial assistance, Elizabeth put herself through college,
first at Riverside Community College and then at San Diego State
University. 95 She hoped to become a social worker but was precluded
from completing a graduate program in social work because the
hospital to which she was assigned for "fieldwork experience" did
not make "reasonable accommodations" for her. 96 The social work
program sought to find a placement for Elizabeth at a facility where
her work would only involve other people with disabilities. 97
Elizabeth rejected the placement. One of Elizabeth's professors in the
social work program said the program would have rejected her had

8? Id
88

Johnson, supra note 38, at 4.

89

Id

90

Id

91

Id

Id
93 Id The program was expensive and yet "cost effective," according to Johnson: "If it
hadn't existed, people like Bouvia would have been put in nursing homes, at a far higher cost."
94 See Longmore, Assisted Suicide, supra note 25, at 153 (citing Hearn, She's Had Enough
Pity, Is Read to Die, RIVERSIDE PRESS-ENTER., Oct. 9, 1983, at B1).
95 See id. at 154.
96 Id. The accommodations in question were mandated by federal law (Section 504 of
the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
92

97

Id.
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they known the extent of her disabilities and warned her that she was
unemployable. 98
Robert Scott, in representing Bouvia, echoed the social work
program's view of Bouvia as unemployable. Longmore, in contrast,
saw the comment from the social work professor as "evidence of
99
discrimination. Bouvia was in effect being told she was worthless."
Bouvia left the social work program. But she seemed already to
have internalized the program's views of her worthlessness. "In fact,
her disability in no way precluded her from fulfilling the requirements
of the program or of her profession. People with more severe
disabilities work productively. The professor's statements were not
only biased, they were discriminatory, again violating her civil rights
under federal law."1 00 Even if Bouvia found employment, she would
have forfeited state benefits when she reported an income.
[S]he would have quickly lost ... the In-Home Supportive
Services which made it possible for her to go to work in the first
place and would be essential to her continuing to work. This is
euphemistically called a "work disincentive." It is, in fact, a
penalty imposed on disabled people who violate the pervasive
social prejudice that they cannot productively contribute to the
economy and community.... 101

Additionally, Bouvia experienced a set of difficult challenges in
her adult personal life. She married Richard Bouvia, became
pregnant, and then miscarried. The marriage between Elizabeth and
Richard did not last. 102 As her marriage was failing, Elizabeth moved
into her father's home. She told her father that Richard could not cope
03
with her physical situation or with the couple's debt.1 Soon after
Bouvia moved to her father's home, he reportedly told Bouvia that

Id.
Johnson, supra note 38, at 6.
Longmore, Assisted Suicide, supranote 25, at 154.
101 Id. at 154-55.
102 Interview by Mike Wallace, CBS co-host, with Elizabeth, CBS News (Sept. 7. 1997)
[hereinafter Wallace, Interview]; Janet L. Dolgin & Lois L. Shepherd, Bioethics and the Law 86
(2d ed. 2009); Johnson, supra note 38, at 3.
103 See Longmore, Assisted Suicide, supra note 25, at 156.
98

99
100
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she was not welcome there; she found new accommodations. 10 4 Even
more, Elizabeth's brother died in a drowning accident during
Elizabeth's early adult years. 105
Within a two-year period, Elizabeth lost her marriage, her
pregnancy, and her brother. She felt that she had been rejected by her
father and saw the dissipation of her professional plans. 106 The last
loss seems largely to have been attributable to biases that led her
mentors to believe she was incapable of productive work.
Unsurprisingly, Elizabeth was depressed. It is not unexpected that a
person-able-bodied or disabled-who faced Elizabeth's challenges
and society's insults to her personhood would become depressed. She
voluntarily entered the Riverside County Hospital as a patient. 107
There, in the early 1980s, she asked the hospital to assist in helping
her to die by starvation. 108
Mary Jane Owen, who worked for the President's Committee on
Employment of the Handicapped as the Bouvia story was developing,
also presented a very different view of Bouvia's situation than had
the California courts and Bouvia's attorneys. Johnson's interpretation
harmonized with that of Paul Longmore1 0 9 : "Were psychiatric
students given the facts of the case of Elizabeth Bouvia, they'd
quickly say she needed not suicide but help," .... "Why," [wrote
Owen in the Disability Rag] "does this bizarre story suddenly become
logical when we add the information that Bouvia is severely
disabled?"" 0 Virtually everyone involved in Elizabeth's legal
cases-her lawyers, the court, Elizabeth herself-seemed to believe
that Elizabeth Bouvia's disabilities made life unbearable.
To her attorneys, Bouvia's roadblocks weren't a reason to
fight for her right to a job or help at home, but clear evidence as
104 See Johnson, supra note 38, at 16. Bouvia's father later said that this claim was false. He
contended that she rejected him; he did not reject her.
105 See Longmore, Assisted Suicide, supra note 25 at 156 (citing 'Withdrawal' or
Suicide?,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1978, at E7, Col. 5).
106 See id. at 156-57.
107
Id
108 Id at 156.
109 Id. at 157.
110 Johnson, supra note 38, at 7 (Bouvia denied that her preference to die was related to her
separation from her husband or her difficulties at school. Moreover, she asserted that counseling
would not be useful. She explained that she was "aware of what's out there; I'm not stupid.").
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to why the right to die was an important one for disabled people.
It was "Whose Life Is it Anyway" in real life. It was all most
people understood about severe disability. And it seemed to be
the way Bouvia looked at it, too. 1 1

Disability rights activists concluded that Richard Scott, who
headed Bouvia's legal team and had helped create the Hemlock
Society,l2 was "manipulat[ing]" Bouvia.13 Referring to Bouvia's
statements proclaiming that her interest in dying stemmed only from
her disabilities and not from other difficult events in her life, these
activists wondered about the source of her assertions and rhetoric:
"[i]t sounded just a little too up on the right-to-die rhetoric in vogue
just then, a little too pat."1 14
Longmore declared that "[s]ociety had no business talking about a
disabled person's right to die before it had given them a right to
live!" 1 5 Activists attributed Bouvia's depression and interest in death
16
To
not to her body but to "what she thought of life in that body."
Longmore, it was more worrisome still that the difference between
granting disabled people a "right to die" and suggesting that such
17
people should be ready to die could be mediated much too easily.
Mary Jane Owen offered a psychological explanation of Bouvia's
wish to be permitted to starve to death.' 1 8 Society prevented Bouvia
from succeeding and at the same time blamed her for that failure. She
9
internalized the contradiction, seeing herself and her life as flawed.1
She could not obviate that flaw nor could she become comfortable
with it. In consequence, she internalized her frustration and anger:
against others, it is common to
"'When we are afraid to express rage
120
turn that rage against ourselves."'

i11

Id

See Humphry, supra note 69 (characterizing Hemlock Society to have advocated for
assisted suicide).
113 Johnson, supranote 38, at 17.
112

114

Id.

115

Id

116
11?

Id.

118
119
120

Id
See id. at 7.
See id. at 8.

Id.
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Bouvia clearly internalized much of what the surrounding society
assumed to be true of people with disabilities.12' Her expressed wish
to die was openly grounded on self-pity: "Everything has to be done
for me. At times it's humiliating and disgusting. I choose to no longer
do that."12 2 "No one," reported Mary Johnson, "seemed to notice that
the woman who saw no reason to live came to court with makeup
carefully applied."1 2 3
Although the California appellate court's 1986 decision granted
Bouvia the right she sought-to die through starvation1 24-she did
not take advantage of that right once it was offered to her. 125 In 1992,
soon after the death by suicide of Bouvia's attorney, Richard Scott,1 26
Bouvia, 35-years-old and living at the County-USC Medical
Center,1 2 7 explained that she regretted not having been permitted to
die through starvation in 1983 when she had first approached the
court with that request. In her view, she would have been "strong
enough" at that time and "ready to go through [with it]."1 28 By this
time, Bouvia had become a challenge for disability rights activists
because she presented herself as helpless and agonized and did not

121

See Stradley, supra note 52, at 418 (citing Wolfenberger et al., THE PRINCIPLE OF
16-24 (Nat'l Inst. on Mental Retardation, 1972) (Belinda
Stradley reports that one psychologist delineated phrases that underlie stereotypes about people
with disabilities. These phrases include: "the Subhuman Organism, the Menace, the Unspeakable
Object of Dread, the Object of Pity, the Holy Innocent, the Diseased Organism, the Object of
Ridicule, the Eternal Child.").
122 Johnson, supra note 38, at 9.
123 Id.
124 See Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. at 1145.
125 See Beverly Beyette, The Reluctant Survivor: 9 Years After Helping Her Fightfor the
Right to Die, Elizabeth Bouvia's Lawyer and Confidante Killed Himself - Leaving Her Shaken
and Living the Life She Dreaded, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1992), https://www.latimes.com/archives
/la-xpm-1992-09-13-vw-1154-story.html (In 1992 the L.A. Times published an article about
Bouvia's decision not to die). Photograph of Elizabeth Bouvia, IMGUR, (Feb. 28, 2018), https:
//imgur.com/a/037gM (an image of a seemingly contented woman in a wheelchair, available on
Imgur, is identified as Elizabeth Bouvia).
126 See Beyette, supra note 125, at 18 (noting that Bouvia's principal attorney, Richard
Scott, killed himself almost a decade after his representation of Elizabeth Bouvia).
127 See Johnson, supra note 38, at 11 (a movement, started in California by Ed Roberts and
other disabled people, focused on providing "independent living" accommodations for disabled
people. While a student at UC Berkeley in the 1960s, Roberts and others developed the Center for
Independent Living. The group favored disabled people living "like everyone," not in a hospital
or nursing home).
128 Beyette, supra note 125, at 2.
NORMALIZATION IN HUMAN SERVICE
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connect those responses to a society that largely failed to
accommodate the needs of people with disabilities.
In the 1992 interview, Bouvia expressed resentment about
29
criticisms of her from disability rights activists.1 At the time, she
explained that she wished to be able to live with family - her father
or one of her sisters. Griffith Thomas, the attorney who replaced Scott
after Scott's death, suggested that Bouvia had a fear of "being
abandoned." 130 Bouvia's own statements and those of Thomas
suggest that Bouvia-presumptively dedicated to independence from
others and autonomy in medical decision-making-actually craved
the opportunity to be part of a community.
In 1992, when Bouvia expressed continuing regret about not
having had the wherewithal to affect her own death, had regained
most of the weight she had lost in the early 1980s and told an L.A.
Times reporter that she was physically well: "'I'm feeling
13 1 all right,
OK."'
doing
I'm
say
could
you
guess
I
mean,
I
OK,
fine,
In a 1997 interview with Mike Wallace of CBS, eleven years after
her court victory, Bouvia explained that "[s]tarvation is not an easy
way to go."13 2 Further, she said, "[y]ou can't just keep doing it and
keep doing it. It [i.e., starvation] really messes up your body. And my
body was already messed up." 133 Yet she described her continuing
physical existence as a "burden to society" (financially and in other
34
ways) - one that troubled her.'
Again, it seems plausible to suggest that one of Bouvia's primary
motivations was a desire-a need-to be heard, to be witnessed. That
need is familiar to most people. Bouvia's history suggests that that
need might have been particularly intense for her.
In sum, it is fair to conclude that Bouvia's legal story and,
ultimately, her medical story, were both grounded on a right to

129

See id. at 4.
130 Id. at 11 (Bouvia said at the time that her sisters were "still young" and would not be
able to manage were she to move in with either of them. They were both in graduate school).
131 Id.
132 Wallace, Interview, supra note 102; Alicia Ouellette, Context Matters: Disability, the
End of Life, and Why the Conversation is Still so Difficult, 58 NYLS L. REv. (213-14), at 387,
n.84.
133 Id
134 Wallace, Interview, supra note 102.
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autonomous individuality, but that Bouvia's case also suggests the
potential limitations of untrammeled patient autonomy. Indeed,
Bouvia herself seemed to yearn for community.
The right to individual autonomy had become increasingly
important in medical settings in the decades surrounding Bouvia's
court hearings. 135 And Bouvia's legal case was among those that
contributed to the increasing autonomy granted to patients, even with
regard to decisions likely or certain to result in their deaths.
Yet, in granting Bouvia the autonomy she sought, the California
Court of Appeals furthered Bouvia's prejudicial view of herself and
her life - a view that had been presented to the court by Bouvia and
her attorneys. To the extent that the right to autonomy in medical
decision-making includes the right to make the "wrong" decision, the
court's holding cannot be faulted. However, to the extent that Bouvia
deserved more- a social and economic environment that would have
shown her new options for a life well lived-the court's reasoning, if
not its holding, is regrettable.
The second story, like Bouvia's, focused on an understanding of
death and dying. Further, McMath's story reflects significant bias and
perhaps prejudice. Beyond those similarities, however, the two
stories, and the legal cases that determined significant elements of
each story, diverged significantly.
Responses to Jahi McMath did not depend on respect for
individual autonomy. Rather, the case suggests the strength of
communal advocacy, both within and outside courts. Yet, at the same
time, Jahi and her family faced significant biases that harmed
everyone involved. In short, Bouvia-autonomous in the eyes of the
law and alone in her personal life-was granted the right she sought
- the right to die. McMath, a young, African American, declared brain
dead by the hospital in which she had had surgery to correct sleep
apnea, found little support from the law or from medicine, but

135 Benjamin Moulton & Jaime S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medical Decision Making:
The Quest for Informed Patient Choice, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85 (2012) (In 2012, Benjamin
Moulton and Jaime King suggested that by that time, social and legal stress on autonomy had gone
too far. Moulton and King hoped society would be able better to balance autonomy and clinician
beneficence).
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compelling and effective support from a tight-knit familial
community, as well as from a larger church community.' 36
III.

Jahi McMath: Competing Narratives

As a young adolescent in California, Jahi McMath, the second of
Nailah (Latasha) Winkfield's four children, suffered from sleep
apnea. 137 Her doctors recommended that she undergo a tonsillectomy
and related procedures. 138 Before the surgery, Jahi told her mother
that she did not want the surgery. Nailah hoped that Jahi would have
the surgery. When Jahi met the surgeon, she questioned him about his
experience and his sleep during the night before her surgery. He
reassured her.
The surgery-a tonsillectomy, adenoidectomy, and two additional
procedures 139-took place on December 9, 2013, at Children's
Hospital Oakland (CHO) in California. 140 The surgery took several

136 See Rick Hurd, et al., Jahi McMath: Family ready to move brain-deadgirl to new
facility; hospital may refuse surgery request, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 26, 2013), https:
40
1//plus.lexis.com/document?crid=98f83369-4fb5-430b-b
3
76401 f4669e2&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3Acontentltem%
-DYT4-v55M-00000A5B55-GMN1
00&pdsourcegroupingtype=&pdcontentcomponentid=313960&pdmfid=1530671 &pdisurlapi=tr
ue&cbc=0.
137
Rachel Aviv, What Does It Mean to Die?: When Jahi McMath was declared brain-dead
by the hospital, herfamily disagreed. Her case challenges the very natureof existence, THE NEW
YORKER (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/02/05/what-does-it-meanto-die.
138 See McMath, 2016 WL 7188019, at *1 (describing related procedures).
139 Id. (the surgery - intended to cure the child's sleep apnea - included an
uvulopalatopharyngoplasty, removal of the child's soft palate and her uvula, as well as "a
submucous resection of her bilateral turbinates."). Complaint at 2, McMath v. Rosen, No.
RG15796121 (Super. Ct. Cal., Dec. 9, 2015) (The case was filed by Milton McMath, Jahi's
biological father. Milton McMath's complaint referred to these procedures, along with the
tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy as "complex and risky surgery for sleep apnea." The complaint
further suggested that Jahi should first have been given a continuous positive airway pressure
machine trial to see if that might have helped her sleep apnea and that, if surgery was still deemed
necessary, the surgeon should have begun with a more limited procedure - including, at first, only
a tonsillectomy and an adenoidectomy). The Hospital's name was later changed to UCSF Benioff
Children's Hospital of Oakland. This complaint was filed for Milton McMath, Jahi's father.
140 See McMath, 2016 WL 7188019, at *1 (note that the hospital's name was later changed).
See Debor Goldschmidt, Jahi McMath, California Teen at Center of Brain-death Controversy,
Has Died, CNN (last updated, June 29, 2018), available at https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/29
/health/jahi-mcmath-brain-dead-teen-death/index.html.
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hours. 141 During the night following the surgery, Jahi began to bleed
profusely. Nailah and her husband, Marvin Winkfield, and later, her
mother, Sandra Chatman, herself a nurse, continually asked for
assistance from hospital clinicians. They were largely ignored by
nurses and doctors who should have been attending to the girl.
Apparently, hospital nurses told Jahi's family members that the girl's
bleeding was "'routine"' and for the most part, refused to help stop
the blood flow, leaving that task to Nailah and her mother. 142 That
night, Jahi suffered a cardiac arrest, and a code was called. 143 As a
result, Jahi's breathing depended on ventilatory support. 14 4
On December 12, three days after Jahi's surgery, hospital
clinicians told Jahi's mother and stepfather that Jahi was brain dead,
and that life-sustaining care would be withdrawn. 145 This part
considers the legal claims that followed these events. Then, Section
B considers medical and legal understandings of brain death. Finally,
Section C discusses Jahi's personal story - the story of a family and
a community.
a.

JahiMcMath: The Legal Case

In response to the hospital's diagnosis of Jahi as brain dead, Nailah
Winkfield, Jahi's mother, secured an attorney and filed a claim in
state court. 14 6 Nailah appealed to state and federal courts for help
several times after this, and Jahi's biological father filed an action
alleging malpractice in 2015.147 These cases did not lead to a new
law, however, they did bring public attention to the girl's story and
thus to its many implications, including the meaning of brain death.

See Aviv, supra note 137, at 3.
142 See Matthias Gafni, Jahi McMath: State Releases Report on Children's Hospital
Oakland's Handling of Patients, E EAST BAY TiMEs (Mar. 12, 2014), https:
//www.eastbaytimes.com/2014/03/12/jahi-mcmath-state-releases-report-on-childrens-hospitaloaklands-handling-of-patients [hereinafter Gafni, State Releases Report].
143 See infra note 292 and accompanying text.
144
Id
145 Complaint at 5, McMath v. Rosen, No. RG15796121 (Super. Ct. Cal., Dec. 9, 2015).
146 See McMath, 2016 WL 7188019 at *2 (citing Dkt. No. 69-2, Exh. A (Ex PartePetition)).
147 See Complaint at 9, McMath v. Rosen, No. RG15796121 (Super.Ct Cal., Dec. 9, 2015).
141
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Further, the legal cases and the story that surrounded them stimulated
14 8
some physicians to re-think the notion of brain death.
While Nailah did not succeed in convincing the court to preclude
the county's issuing of a death certificate for Jahi, a negotiated
agreement between Nailah, the hospital, and the county resulted in
Nailah's being allowed to transport Jahi to New Jersey, a state in
which she would be considered legally alive, despite the brain death
diagnosis in California. 149 In short, the legal cases initiated by Jahi's
mother and father did not upend state statutory provisions that defined
brain death. However, these cases, and Jahi's story more broadly,
received significant public attention - in large part a result of Jahi's
family's efforts. This led to publications in scholarly journals and in
the public media that have questioned the certainty of at least some
brain death diagnoses.' 50
Soon after CHO declared Jahi, brain dead, Nailah filed an ex parte
application, seeking a temporary restraining order to ensure that her
daughter would be kept on a ventilator.' 5 1 She wanted to keep Jahi's
body oxygenated until she could arrange transfer to a facility that
would agree to treat Jahi as a living child.' 5 2 On the day that Nailah
filed her petition for the restraining order, the state court granted the
temporary restraining order (TRO) that Nailah requested, thereby
precluding the immediate withdrawal of ventilatory support for
Jahi.15 3
Subsequent to that order, the court heard testimony from two
54
Neither
physicians who had reviewed Jahi's medical situation.'
5 5 Each concluded that, in
physician was one who had treated Jahi.1

148 See Ariane Lewis, Editorial, The Legacy ofJahi McMath, 29 NEUROCRITICAL CARE 519
(2018) [hereinafter Lewis, The Legacy].
149 See McMath, 2016 WL 7188019, at *1 (considering agreement that allowed Nailah to
gain custody of her daughter's body).
150 See infra note 244-47 and accompanying text.
151 McMath, 2016 WL 7188019, at *2. See also Winkfield, No. 4:13-cv-05993-SBA at *1.
152 McMath, 2016 WL 7188019, at *1.
153 Id at *2.
154 See Complaint at 6, Winkfield v. Children's Hosp. Oakland, No. 4:13-cv-05993SBA,(N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2013).
155 See Winkfield, No. 4:13-cv-05993-SBA, at *3 (one of these physicians, Dr. Paul Graham
Fisher, Chief of the Division of Child Neurology at the Stanford University School of medicine,
was appointed by the court).
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light of medical standards defining brain death, Jahi was dead. 156
Largely on the basis of this testimony, supporting the conclusions of
clinicians at CHO about Jahi's status, the trial court dissolved the
TRO and concluded that Jahi was brain dead.' 5 7
On December 26, 2013, the court issued a written statement that
declared that Jahi was brain dead as defined by state law.158 Judge
Grillo for the trial court asserted, first, that Jahi was dead in
compliance with California law,1 59 and second, in consequence, that
insertion of feeding and tracheal tubes "'would arguably be medically
ineffective or contrary to generally accepted health care standards, or
60
could violate medical or ethical norms."'1
In response, Jahi's mother sought relief in federal court. 161 There,
Nailah relied on the U.S. Constitution and federal statutory law 6 2 to
support her request that Jahi be provided with ventilatory support and
assistance with hydration and nutrition, as well as other medical
treatments until she could locate a facility willing to care for Jahi on
156

See id. at *2.
157 See McMath, 2016 WL 7188019, at *1, (citing Health and Safety Code sections 7180
7181); See Winkfield, No. 4:13-cv-05993-SBA, at *6.
158 Plaintiff's Opposition To State Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 5, McMath v. Cal. No.
3:15-cv-06042 HSG (N.D. Cal., May 12, 2016).
159 McMath, 2016 WL 7188019, at *2 (noting that definition of brain death in the state was
found in Health and Safety Code sections 7180 and 7181).
160 Id (in mid-January 2014, the same court denied Jahi's mother's renewed request for a
tracheostomy for her daughter and a gastric tube).
161 See Winkfield, No. 4:13-cv-05993-SBA, at *7-10 (Judge Armstrong for the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, Oakland Division, explained in her opinion
(regarding an order to show cause) that the action was brought by Nailah Winkfield and Jahi
McMath, while a similar action, initiated by the same plaintiffs, was being considered in state
court. The claims were somewhat different. However, Judge Armstrong questioned whether the
federal district court had jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That doctrine
precludes a lower federal court "'from hearing de facto appeals from state court judgments[.]"'
Judge Armstrong further explained:
At a minimum, the claims herein appear to be "inextricably intertwined" with the
state court action, thereby triggering application of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine (Doe
v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9" Cir. 2005) (where Rooker-Feldman applies, a federal
court "must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is 'inextricably
intertwined' with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision.").
The federal court also considering issues of mootness and standing. It concluded by giving the
plaintiffs "an opportunity to demonstrate why the instant action should not be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction."
162 See id. at *3. (Nailah Winkfield invoked the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments
of the U.S. Constitution as well as Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Sec.
794 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12101).

CHOOSING DEATH, SHAPING DEATH

2022]

87

63
a long-term basis "'in accordance with her religious beliefs."1
Nailah asserted that she was a Christian but did not seem to have
provided additional information to the courts about her church and its
specific views on brain death. 164 She did assert expressly, however,
that her religious beliefs demanded that her daughter be treated as a
living child. 16 5 Nailah's claim to have had such religious beliefs
appears to have been sincere. 166
On January 3, 2014, before the federal court opined on Nailah and
Jahi's request for relief regarding continuing medical care (including
ventilatory support and support with nutrition and hydration), the
parties framed an agreement to facilitate the transfer of Jahi to a
167
facility that would care for her according to Nailah's preferences.
68
The transfer was made three days later.' In consequence, the federal
court found it "questionable" (even beyond issues raised by the
69
concurrent cases in state and federal courts)1 that a live controversy
17 0
continued to exist. The court gave Nailah an opportunity to explain
why, in her view, the case was not moot. 171 However, she agreed to
dismiss the action.1 72
Judge Armstrong of the U.S. district court further recommended
that the parties enter into negotiations about transferring custody of

163 Id at *4; See also McMath, 2016 WL7188019, at *1 (citing Complaint at 5, Winkfield
v. Children's Hosp. Oakland, No. 4:13-cv-05993-SBA (N.D. Cal., Dec. 30, 2013).
164 Complaint at 4, Winkfield, No. 4:13-cv-05993-SBA (N.D. Cal., Dec. 30, 2013)
("Plaintiffs are Christians with firm religious beliefs that as long as the heart is beating, Jahi is
alive... These religious beliefs involve providing all treatment, care, and nutrition to a body that is
living, treating it with respect and seeking to encourage its healing.").
165 Id
166 See John M. Luce, The Uncommon Case ofJahi McMath, 147 CHEST 1144, 1147 (2015);
see also Complaint at 4, Winkfield, No. 4:13-cv-05993-SBA (Winkfield based her objection to the
brain death diagnosis on her "sincerely held religious beliefs." She further explained:
Plaintiffs' religious beliefs are also informed by Winkfield's person knowledge of
at least one person other than her daughter who had been diagnosed as brain dead,
where the decision makers were encouraged to "pull the plug" yet refused, and
thereafter their loved one emerged from legal "brain death" to a state where they had
brain function).
167 See Winkfield, No. 4:13-cv-05993-SBA at *4.
168

169

Id

Id. at *6.
170 Id (The court ordered the parties to meet to discuss the issues at stake and to consider
whether, in their views, the case in federal court had become moot).
171 See id. at *8.
172 See McMath, 2016 LEXIS 290, at *9.

88

QUINNIPIAC HEALTH LAW

[Vol. 25:1

Jahi's body to Nailah.1 73 The Magistrate's office scheduled a
settlement conference for 11 a.m. on January 3, 2014.174 Earlier on
the same day, the parties reached an agreement in state court that
provided for the transfer of Jahi's body from the hospital to the county
coroner and then to Nailah.1 75 Details regarding these transfers of
Jahi's body (or of Jahi, herself, depending on perspective) were
further debated in conference with the Magistrate.1 76 Eventually, an
agreement was reached. 177 Details of the negotiations and consequent
arrangements were complicated and exacerbated confusion about the
implications of Jahi's medical condition.1 7 8 In brief, Nailah agreed
"under protest"1 7 9 that the county coroner would sign a death
certificate - though she denied that Jahi was dead. Issuance of a death
certificate seemed necessary in order for Nailah to gain permission to
be given custody of her daughter's body (which the county defined
as dead and which Nailah viewed as alive).1 80
The death certificate noted the "cause of death" as "'pending
investigation.""181 But as a practical matter, the legal proceedings and
negotiations among the parties in early 2014 resulted in honoring the
hospital's demand that the child be declared dead,1 82 and at the same
time, facilitating release by the Alameda County coroner of the child
(or the child's body, depending on perspective) to the custody of her
mother. 8 3 Nailah fought to have the county's death certificate for
173

See id.
See Winkfield, No. 4:13-cv-05993-SBA, at *4.
See id.; see also Christina Q. Nguyen, Comment: Deathas Liberty, 49 U.S.F. L REv.387,
388 (2015).
176 See Winkfield, No. 4:13-cv-05993-SBA, at *4.
177 See id
178 See id.
179 Plaintiff's Opposition To State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 6, No. 3:15-cv-06042
-HSG (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2015) (once a death certificate was issued, Nailah Winkfield was able
to obtain a "disposition permit." Generally, such permits allow survivors to receive a body for
preparation for internment or cremation).
180 Id; see also § 7.52. Case histories - Jahi McMath, NY ELDER L. AND SPECIAL NEEDS
PRACTICE UPDATE, (N.Y. Elder L. and Special Needs Practice, N.Y.) June 2021, at 1.
181 Aviv, supra note 137, at 8.
182 See McMath, 2016 WL 718809, at *2.
183 See id. at*2; See N.J. Declaration of Death Act, § 26:6A-3 (2021) (defining brain death);
N.J. Declaration of Death Act, § 26:6A-5 (2021) (the statute includes a religious exception that
allows someone with religious beliefs that oppose a diagnosis of death by neurological criteria to
be defined as living).

174
175
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Jahi overturned as late as 2018 when Jahi was declared dead in
California. 18 4
Once the county issued the death certificate and Nailah gained
85
custody of Jahi, the hospital disconnected Jahi's ventilator.' Nurses
from an air-evacuation service-connected Jahi to a portable
ventilatory device.' 86 Even Nailah was unaware of the location to
which her child would be sent. Her attorney was apparently "afraid
187
that the hospital would find out and somehow thwart the plan."
That fear suggests the level of distrust that permeated relationships
between Jahi's family and the Children's Hospital Oakland.
Jahi was transported to New Jersey1 88 because, in that state, a law
offered a religious exemption for those who would otherwise be
declared brain dead. The law in question provided that a person's
death:
shall

not

be

declared

upon

the

basis

of neurological

criteria... when the licensed physician authorized to declare
death, has reason to believe, on the basis of information in the
individual's available medical records, or information provided
by a member of the individual's family or any other person
knowledgeable about the individual's personal religious beliefs
that such a declaration would violate the personal religious
beliefs of the individual. In these cases, death shall be declared,
and the time of death fixed, solely upon the basis of cardiorespiratory criteria ... 189

Goldschmidt, supra note 140.
Aviv, supra note 137, at 8.
186 Id. at 9.
187 Id
188 Id. See Katie Nelson & Elisabeth Nardi, Jahi McMath: Family Trying to Raise Money
to Get 13-year-old Airlifted Out of State, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEws (Dec. 28, 2013), https:
//www.mercuryenws/com/2013/12/28/jahi-mcmath-family-trying-to-raise-money-to-get-13year-old-airlifted-out-of-state-3/ (last updated Aug. 12, 2016, 9:46 AM) (expenses were covered,
at least in part, through a Go Fund Me website that Nailah Winkfield created to pay for Jahi to be
airlifted to a hospital outside California. Winkfield hoped to raise $20,000). Jahi McMath Fund,
https://www.gofundme.com/f/jahi-mcmath (last visited July 12, 2021) (in July 2021, after Jahi's
death in New Jersey, the website for the fund noted that the family had raised $65,100).
189 N.J. Declaration of Death Act, § 26:6A-5 (2014) (the statute expressly provides for the
continuation of health care and insurance for a person not declared brain dead by reason of
religious belief); N.J. Declaration of Death Act §26:6A-7 (2013) ("No health care practitioner or
other health care provider, and no health service plan, insurer, of governmental authority, shall
deny coverage or exclude from the benefits of service any individual solely because of that
184

185
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The legal proceedings and consequent responses of the parties
created significant confusion. Public media augmented the confusion
and consternation about Jahi's status by referring to her as dead but
to her body as alive, or by referring to Jahi as dead but asserting that
she was receiving life-sustaining care.1 9 0 For instance, a California
newspaper summarized a story reporting that the California state
court had dissolved the restraining order that required the hospital to
continue ventilatory support for Jahi.1 9 1 The newspaper article
referred to the testimony of the two physicians whom the state court
had appointed to review Jahi's neurological state: 192 "Both [doctors]
testified that the teen is brain-dead and that her body is alive only
because of a ventilator hooked up to her since Dec. 12 [2013]."193 To
most people not familiar with brain-death diagnoses, that report may
have suggested that Jahi was brain dead but that she was also "alive."
Nailah submitted several additional motions to the California trial
court and to the federal court that had entertained Nailah's initial
complaints. Among these later petitions, Nailah filed an action in the
county trial court in October of 2014, asking to have the 2013
declaration declaring Jahi dead in California overturned; she referred
to new evidence that Jahi was not dead. 194 After the court-appointed
one of the same experts who had originally confirmed the position of
hospital clinicians who opined that Jahi was brain dead in 2013,
Nailah withdrew her petition. 195 In addition, Jahi's biological

individual's personal religious beliefs regarding the application of neurological criteria for
declaring death.").
Winkfield, No. 4:13-cv-05993-SBA, at *10 (after transfer of the child to her mother's custody,
Judge Armstrong, for the federal district court, concluded that the federal court had not had or "no
longer [had] jurisdiction to consider the merits of Plaintiff's claims").
190 See, e.g., Rich Hurd & David Debolt, JahiMcMath: Judge Denies Petitionto Keep Girl
on Ventilator Past Dec. 30, MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 24, 2013), https://www.mercurynews.com
/2013/12/24/jahi-mcmath-judge-denies-petition-to-keep-girl-on-ventilator-past-dec-30/.
191 See id.
192 See id. See also Plaintiff's Opposition To State Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
at 9,
McMath, No. 3:15-cv-06042 HSG (referring to trial court appointment of two experts to examine
Jahi).
193 Id.
194 See McMath, 2016 WL 718809, at *3.
195 Plaintiff's Opposition To State Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 9, McMath, No. 3:15cv-06042 HSG (Nailah Winkfield disputed the claim that she withdrew the request. She reports
that she asked the trial court judge to permit her to contact the expert who had been appointed by
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father, 19 6 Milton McMath, initiated a malpractice action, naming the
surgeon who had operated on Jahi and the hospital in which he
operated as defendants. 197 That action sought, personal injury
damages or, alternatively, wrongful death damages (depending on
whether the child was considered alive or dead). 198
Milton McMath's complaint provided a detailed and lengthy list
of actions deemed to have constituted negligent care. McMath alleged
that Jahi's surgeon had neglected to inform hospital clinicians caring
for Jahi after the surgery that the girl was at increased risk for
bleeding due to an arterial condition. 199 Further, the complaint
contended that hospital personnel, including medical clinicians and
social workers, put pressure on Jahi's family to accept Jahi's death,
200 and to agree to
to permit Jahi to be placed on an organ donor list,
2 01
At that time, Nailah is
the discontinuance of all care for Jahi.
reported to have been pressured to withdraw life support even though,
in her view, she had been given no explanation of what had happened
to her daughter. 202 In the family's view, the hospital and its clinicians
cared about having an organ donor but did not care about Jahi
McMath. 20 3
In light of the legal definition of brain death in California, the
hospital's decision to withdraw life-support was justified. However,
the timing and the manner in which the hospital and its clinicians
the court to examine Jahi and who concluded, in harmony with the hospital's conclusions, that she
was brain dead. According to Nailah, the judge did not do that).
196 See Matthias Gafni, Jahi McMath: BiologicalFatherSues Hospital Claiming Botched
4
Surgery, MERCURY NEws (Aug. 11, 2016), (https://www.mercurynews.com/2015/12/1 /jahimcmath-biological-father-sues-hospital-claiming-botched-surgery/ [hereinafter Gafni, Biological
Father] (Milton McMath and Jahi's mother, Nailah, never married. McMath was not an active
part of Jahi's life before her surgery. McMath asserted that he was attempting to create a
relationship with Jahi before the surgery). See Winkfield, No. 4:13-cv-05993-SBA (Marvin
Winkfield, Nailah's husband and Jahi's stepfather, had been a plaintiff in an earlier lawsuit that
raised similar claims. The judge concluded that Winkfield did not have standing to bring the case).
197 McMath, 2016 WL 7188019, at *3.

198 Id
199 Family Says Hospital PressuredThem

WL

to Remove PatientFrom Life Support, 10 No. 21

J. MED. MALPRACTICE 1 (2015).
200

Id

201 See id. See also Complaint at 4, Winkfield, No. 4:13-cv-05993-SBA (the claim that Dr.
Durand said that Jahi was "Dead, Dead, Dead, Dead").
202 See Complaint at 6, McMath v. Rosen, No. RG15796121 (Super. Ct. Cal Dec. 9, 2015).
203
See id (noting response of doctor to Nailah Winkfield when she sought further
explanations of her daughter's situation and requested the continuation of life-sustaining care).
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responded to the family-a family shocked to learn that their recently
healthy child was considered dead after a tonsillectomy, even as her
skin was warm, and her heart was beating-raises concern. Nailah
asked, simply, how can my daughter be dead? 204
In late 2015, Nailah again asked the federal district court in
California to acknowledge that Jahi (by then in New Jersey) was alive
and that she thus enjoyed constitutional rights. 205 At the time, Nailah
hoped to bring Jahi back to California from New Jersey, where they
had been since early 2014. Before that could happen, Nailah wanted
to ensure that the girl's ventilatory support and assistance with
hydration and nutrition would continue once they reached
California. 206 The action commenced with Nailah and Jahi as
plaintiffs, was grounded on the claim that the child was alive and thus
enjoyed the constitutional rights to life and to travel within the United
States. 207 The parties' motion explained that
[p]laintiff Nailah Winkfield, Jahi's mother, has traveled an
exhaustive road seeking to obtain due process. What she seeks is
to present undisputed medical testimony that, today, Jahi does
not meet California's definition of brain death, no matter what
her condition was on December 23rd 2013. Jahi shows numerous
objective signs of brain activity, including: brain wave activity
on an EEG, cerebral blood flow, intact brain matter, an ability to
respond to her mother's voice as demonstrated by an increase in
her heart rate and the ability to respond to her mother's request
to move specific body parts. 208

The action aimed to convince the court to review evidence that
Jahi was alive, regardless of determinations regarding her status in
2013.209 Judge Hayward Gilliam, writing for the federal district court,
concluded that Nailah's motion regarding the claim that Jahi "was
204 J.J. Paris et al., Brain Death, Dead, and ParentalDenial, 23 CAMBRIDGE QUARTERLY
371, 378 (2014).
205
See McMath, 2016 WL 7188019, at *5.
206 See Winkfield, No. 4:13-cv-05993-SBA, at *3;
see also McMath, 2016 WL 7188019, at *1 (invoking the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans
with Disabilities Act).
207 See McMath, 2016 WL 7188019, at *4.
208 Plaintiff's Opposition To State Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1,
McMath v. Cal.,
No. 3:15-cv-06042 HSG (N.D. Cal., April 15, 2016).
209 See id. at 9.
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incorrectly found to be brain dead on December 24, 2013" could
proceed. 2 10 But the court stayed the action, waiting for a ruling from
state courts addressing whether California brain death law provided
guidance for overturning a brain death diagnosis as a result of
subsequent evidence. 211
At the same time, Jahi was deemed alive in New Jersey. This
reflected one of the most confounding parameters of Jahi's medical
situation. Jahi McMath was deemed alive in one state-New Jerseybut dead in another - California, where a death certificate for her had
been filed. 2 12 The contention of Jahi's family that the California death
certificate was invalid, 2 13 rested, at least in part, on the fact that the
certificate did not state a cause of death. Rather, it included the words
"pending investigation." 2 14
The varied responses of medicine, the law to Jahi's situation,
between the declaration of death in California in 2013 and living in
New Jersey for more than four years then dying there in 2018, were
confusing and distressing to many people. In part, these apparently
conflicting responses reflect confusions in understandings of brain
21 5
death. Brain death is the subject of debate even among experts.
In any event, after Jahi was taken to New Jersey in early 2014, that
state's law provided legal clarity as long as the girl was kept in New
Jersey. There, state law allowed for Jahi to be treated by medical
clinicians as a living child. 2 16 In 2018, more than four years after
Nailah brought Jahi to New Jersey, the girl was declared dead
according to cardio-pulmonary criteria for death. At first, the family
continued its efforts to have the 2013 California death certificate
McMath, 2016 WL 7188019, at *20.
Id. (citing relevant law: California Health and Safety Code Secs. 7180 and 7181).
212 See id. at *3 -*4. After Jahi was declared dead in New Jersey, the family's attorney
promised that he would continue to work pro bono to have the date of the child's death in
California listed as June 22, 2018, the date on which Jahi McMath was declared dead in New
Jersey. See Goldschmidt, supra note 140.
213 See Complaint at 6, McMath v. Rosen, No. RG15796121 (Super. Ct. Cal., Dec. 9, 2015).
Further, the death certificate did not include a physician's signature, certifying that Jahi had died.
Id.
214 See Plaintiff's Opposition To State Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 6, McMath, No.
3:15-cv-06042-HSG.
215 See infra, Section B. Medical and Legal Determinations of Death.
216 See N.J. Declaration of Death Act, § 26:6A-3 (2021) (defining brain death), supra note
183 (noting relevant provisions in New Jersey law on brain death).
210
211
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revoked. However, a year later, the family and the State agreed that
the case should be dismissed without prejudice. 2 17
b.

Medical and Legal Determinations of Death

Jahi McMath's story encouraged the re-examination of brain death
determinations which had long been elusive and were sometimes
openly challenged, in part because they were explicitly drafted,
among other reasons, to provide for more organ donors. 2 18 In fact,
now, most deceased organ donors are people who have received brain
death diagnoses. 219 Although court responses to the litigation
initiated by Jahi's family members did not directly result in policy
changes regarding understandings of brain death, they had an indirect
effect, in that Jahi's story stimulated challenges to state laws defining
brain death.220 Those challenges have been accompanied by shifts in
policy. 22 1

In the months immediately following Jahi's brain death diagnosis
and her family's efforts to preserve ventilatory support and assistance
with hydration and nutrition for Jahi, many experts in law, medicine,
and bioethics were highly critical of the family for insisting on what
these experts understood to be impossible; they were even critical of
CHO for failing to preclude the family's resistance. 22 2 In 2014, John
Paris defined "the fundamental problem" with Jahi McMath's case to

217 See Notice of Stipulation and Dismissal Pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) at 1, McMath
v. Cal., No. 4:15-cv-06042-HSG (N.D. Cal., Dec. 23, 2015).
218 Thaddeus Mason Pope, Brain Death Forsaken: Growing Conflict and New Legal
Challenges, 37 J. LEG. MED. 265, 288 (2017); see also Robert M. veatch, Would a Reasonable
Person Now Accept the 1968 Harvard Brain Death Report? A Short History of Brain Death, 48
HASTINGS CTR. REP. S6 (1918) (noting that the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee that crafted the
definition of brain death in the late 1960s, believed, among other things, that the new definition
would "address controversy over obtaining organs for transplant").
219 See Jonah McKeown, Proposedchange to brain death laws draws criticismfrom some
doctors, ethicists, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (May 18, 2021), https://www.catholicnews
agency.com/news/247703/proposed-change-to-brain-death-laws-draws-criticism-from-somedoctors-ethicists.
220 See id. (every state relied on the Uniform Determination of Death Act to provide for
determinations of brain death, though sometimes with modifications in the model act's language).
221 See id. (noting that legislation regarding brain death, introduced in Puerto Rico in 2017
explained that need for the bill was the result of "recent 'uncomfortable and painful' cases reported
in the media.")
222 See, e.g., Paris et al., supra note 204, at 379-80 (2014).
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have been "the odd rulings of the trial judge and the corybantic
activity of those who, despite the medical evidence and legal findings
223
Paris argued that a brain
of brain death, insist that Jahi is not dead."
death diagnosis should not be treated differently than any other death.
In fact, he suggested that the very term "brain death" only leads to
confusion and should be replaced with the word death. 224 Similarly,
Arthur Caplan, a bioethicist at New York University, declared that
permitting Nailah to transfer Jahi's body to a facility in a state where
the girl would continue to receive ventilatory support and assistance
with nutrition and hydration made no "medical or moral sense."
"What is being done to her corpse," he said, "is wrong."225
Yet, by the time Jahi was declared dead in New Jersey, more than
four years after she was brought there, some experts faced doubts
22 6
Jahi McMath's
about Jahi's status during the intervening years.
story requires some understanding of the term "brain death," as
defined in law and in medicine, and of challenges to the definition of
brain death, originally proposed by a group at Harvard Medical
School in 1968.227
Before the second half of the twentieth century, death was
determined through reference to the cessation of cardio-pulmonary
functions. Medical clinicians questioned this standard once
respiratory and cardiac functions could be sustained with the use of
mechanical ventilation. 228 In 1968, an ad hoc committee at Harvard's
medical school published the "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of
the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain
Death." 2 2 9 The Report had implications for people on ventilators with
severe brain injury, and it carried significance with regard to the
availability of organs for transplantation. It was extraordinarily
influential. 230
223

Id. at 380.

224

Id.

225
226
227

Id. (quoting Arthur Caplan).
See, e.g., Lewis, The Legacy, supra note 148, at 519.
See Pope, supra note 218, at 270.

228

See id.

229 See generallyA Definition ofIrreversible Coma: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the
HarvardMedical School to Examine the Definition ofBrain Death, 205 JAMA 337 (1968).
230 See Roberg D. Truog, et al., Brain Death at Fifty: Exploring Consensus, Controversy,
and Contexts, HASTINGS CTR. REP, S2 (Nov.-Dec. 2018).
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Implementation of the notion of brain death facilitated increased
organs for donation. The organs of patients can be kept oxygenated
until ventilatory support is withdrawn. In addition, though much less
often noted, brain dead diagnoses preclude the costs of caring for
people who will, presumably, never again achieve brain function. 23 1
By the early 1980s, the American legal system began to widely
incorporate the brain death rule, which viewed brain death as an
alternative form of death. The Uniform Determination of Death Act
(UDDA), initially constructed by a presidential commission in 1981,
gained approval from the American Medical Association in 1980 and
from the American Bar Association in 1981. The UDDA defines
death on the basis of either cardiopulmonary criteria or brain
criteria.232 The Act begins by defining the word death to refer to: "An
individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of
circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of
all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A
determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted
medical standards." 2 33
Every state provided for the determination of death on the basis of
neurological criteria.234 About one-third of the states that
promulgated the UDDA have modified the model act's language. 2 35
In 1995, about a decade and a half after the development of the
Uniform Determination of Death Act and almost three decades after
the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee proposed that death should be
declared on the basis of the cessation of neurological activity, the

231 This can be a form of rationing medical care and, as such, has been controversial. See
Janet L. Dolgin Re-Making the "Right to Die" Give Me Liberty but Do Not Give Me Death, 73
SMU L. Rev. 47, 57 (2020). It should be noted that, as a theoretical matter, rationing and futility
can be distinguished, with rationing costs balancing against benefits. In contrast, futility decisions
should be grounded in an investigation as to whether or not they will work. See Jeffrey P. Burns
& Robert D. Truog, Futility: A Concept in Evolution, 132 CHEST, 1987, 1991 (2007).
232 Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA).
233 Uniform Determination of Death Act § 1. The Act has provided a model for determining
death in every state, though statutory specifics vary. See Ariane Lewis, et al., Shouldn't Dead be
Dead?: The Search for a Uniform Definition of Death, 45 J. L. MED. ETHICS 112, 113 (2017)
[hereinafter Lewis et al., Shouldn't Dead be Dead?].
234 See John M. Luce, The Uncommon Case ofJahi McMath, 14 CHEST 1144, 1147 (2015).
235 See Michael Cook, UDDA and RUDDA: uproar over possible change in brain death
criteria, BIOEDGE (May 30, 2021), https://www.bioedge.org/bioethics/udda-and-rudda-uproarover-possible-change-in-brain-death-criteria/ 13816.
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Quality Standards Subcommittee of the American Academy of
Neurology (AAN) crafted guidelines that summarized the
components of a clinical exam for brain death and noted the
limitations of the test. 2 3 6 The AAN Subcommittee also delineated a
set of exclusionary factors for a brain death diagnosis, including
hypothermia and certain drugs. Further, they noted conditions that
could be confused with brain death. 237 In 2010, updating its 1995
guidelines, the Subcommittee reported that no one diagnosed as brain
238
dead on the basis of the 1995 criteria had recovered brain function.
This claim, voiced often, has been challenged by Jahi McMath's

case. 239
Efforts to update the UDDA are underway, and proposals for
2 40
One
revision are being studied by the Uniform Law Commission.
responds
Act
Death
of
Determination
Uniform
proposal for a Revised
to confusion about the medical standards for diagnosing brain
death. 2 4 1 The proposal does not require that a patient tested for brain.
death show loss of all brain function. 2 4 2 Challenges to that proposal
have focused precisely on the proposal's absence of mandated tests
for the cessation of all brain function and on the suggestion that the
word "all" be omitted from the current UDDA which requires
"'irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain"' before
brain death can be declared.2 4 3 In short, the proposed change would

236 Lewis et al., Shouldn't Dead be Dead?, supra note 233, at 114.
237 Id. (these conditions included "Guillain-Barre syndrome, organophosphate poisoning,
high cervical spine injury, lidocaine toxicity, baclofen overdose, and delayed neuromuscular
blockade clearance.").
238 Id.
239 See, e.g., Lola Butcher, When the Line between life and death is "a Little Bit Fuzzy,"
2
SALON (May 16, 2021), https://www.salon.com/20 1/05/16/when-the-line-between-life-anddeath-is-a-little-bit-fuzzy_partner/.
240 See id.
241 See McKeown, supra note 219 (among other things, the authors of the proposal (Ariane
Lewis, Richard Bonnie & Thaddeus Pope) would allow declarations of brain death even in the
presence of hypothalamic and pituitary activity).
242

Id.

243 See id. (omission of the word "all" would facilitate brain death declarations despite the
presence of hypothalamic and pituitary gland function); see also, D. Alan Shewmon, Statement in
Support of Revising the Uniform Determination of Death Act and in Opposition to a Proposed
Revision, THE J. OF MED. & PHILOSOPHY 4-5 (May 14, 2021), https://academic.oup.com/jmp
(challenging proposal for
/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jmp/jhab014/6275576#247743303
revision of the UDDA). The Statement, prepared by Dr. Shewmon, was endorsed by more than
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allow for brain death diagnoses despite some brain activity. Most
often, this change is intended to allow for hypothalamic-pituitary
function in people diagnosed as brain dead. 244 Opponents of the
proposal argue that its inclusion would facilitate false brain death
diagnoses. 2 4 s
Alan Shewmon, a pediatric neurologist who prepared a statement
regarding revision of the Uniform Determination of Death Act-a
statement endorsed by over 100 experts-has been an important
voice in challenges to the proposal as well as to the central
assumptions that undergird the UDDA. 2 46 Shewmon's Statement
contends that the assumption that brain death is the "same
physiological state as traditional (circulatory-respiratory) death" is
erroneous. That contention upends the very notion of brain death as
proposed in 1968:
Subsequent accumulated clinical experience with BD [brain
dead] bodies proved this assumption [that brain death is no
different than cardio-pulmonary death] to be false. BD bodies are
physiologically equivalent not to traditional cadavers but to
severely neurologically injured patients who are almost but not
quite BD. BD is indeed an 'irreversible coma' (to use the
infelicitous title term of the 1968 Harvard Committee report ...
- in fact, the most severe form thereof; but coma, whether
reversible or irreversible, is not biological death. One cannot say
with semantic correctness that a cadaver or corpse is
comatose. 247

These conclusions were supported by more than 100 physicians,
legal scholars, bioethicists, and philosophers. 248 This group
concluded that people should be permitted to opt-out of a brain death
100 experts. The endorsers include physicians, social scientists, lawyers, philosophers,
psychologists, and bioethicists, among others.
244 See Michael Nair-Collins et al., Hypothalamic-PituitaryFunction in Brain Death: A
Review, 31 J. INTENSIVE CARE MED. 41, 47 (2014), file:///C:/Users/JLD-LG-/AppData/Local
/Temp/PDF%20datastream.pdf (concluding that many patients declared brain dead "nonetheless
maintain some brain function" and are thus "in a strict sense, . .. false positives"). The proposed
changes would also allow clinicians to test for brain death without family consent. Id.
245 See McKeown, supra note 219 (referring to case of Jahi McMath, noting
in particular,
Jahi's commencing menstruation while diagnosed as brain dead).
246
See generally Shewmon, supra note 243.
247 Id. at 5.
248 See Cook, supra note 235 (reporting on support for Shewmon's statement).
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diagnosis: "People have a right to not have a concept of death that
experts vigorously debate imposed upon them against their judgment
and conscience; any revision of the UDDA should therefore contain
an opt-out clause for those who accept only a circulatory-respiratory
criterion." 249 Were that proposal to be widely approved, stories such
as that of Jahi McMath's would not re-occur.
In short, despite the ubiquity of the Uniform Determination of
20
definitions of death
Death Act (passed in some form in every state),
murky. There is
remain
death
determining
for
and methods
disagreement among medical clinicians about when brain death
should be diagnosed, and concern because all hospitals do not employ
uniform tests for assessing brain death. 2 51 Similarly, state courts and
2 2
legislatures have adopted varying interpretations of brain death.
Significant disagreement continues to shape discussions of Jahi
McMath's story and, in particular, shape discussion of whether she
was alive during the years after she was taken by her family to New
25 4 term-"she was
Jersey 25 3 where-to use Alan Shewmon's
255
Interestingly, Dr. Shewmon-who had
statutorily resurrected."
diagnosed between 150 to 200 cases of brain death in his career256_
concluded that Jahi McMath met the guidelines for a diagnosis of
brain death in children (as well as the guidelines for determining brain
death in adults) in late 2013.257 Yet, Shewmon concluded that later,

249

Id.

250 See Butcher, supra note 239.
251 See id. Ariane Lewis suggested that Jahi's case should lead to revision of the UDDA
with a focus on the implications of the phrases "accepted medical standards" and the "entire
brain."Lewis, The Legacy, supra note 148.
252 Butcher, supra note 239.
253 See id.
254 Dr. Shewmon is a pediatric neurologist and Professor Emeritus at the David Geffen
School of Medicine of the University of California at Los Angeles. He is board certified in
pediatrics, neurology, and clinical neurophysiology. See Declaration of D. Alan Shewmon, M.D.
at 2, Winkfield v. Rosen, No. RG15760730 (Super. Ct. Cal., County of Alameda, Dec. 22, 2017)
[hereinafter Declaration of Shewmon]. See Norman K. Swazo, JahiMcMath andthe Ethics of the
Brain Death Standard, 5 Bangladesh J. Bioethics 18, 19 (2014).
255 D. Alan Shewmon, The Case ofJahi McMath: A Neurologist's View, HASTINGS CTR.
REP, S74 (Nov-Dec. 2018), [hereinafter Shewmon, The Case ofJahi McMath].
256 See Declaration of Shewmon, supra note 254, at 2.
257 Id. at 3.
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Jahi was not, in fact, brain dead.258 Clearly, the two conclusions, read
together, challenge the notion of brain death. Shewmon explained,
There is no question that in December 2013 at Oakland
Children's Hospital, Jahi McMath fulfilled the widely accepted
pediatric guidelines for determining brain death.... , as well as
the adult guidelines, both regarded as the accepted medical
standards. There is equally no question in my mind that she no
longer does, for the single reason that the first of the "three
cardinal findings in brain death" - coma, absence of brainstem
reflexes, and apnea - is not fulfilled. Rather, she is intermittently
responsive, placing her in the category of "minimally conscious
state." 259

If Shewmon's analysis holds up, it offers support for those who
challenge the conclusion that no one recovers after a brain death
diagnosis.
Shewmon estimated that the shift in Jahi's consciousness occurred
in the spring of 2014, three or four months after the catastrophic
events that led to the brain death determination at the Children's
Hospital in Oakland. Soon after Jahi was diagnosed as brain dead, her
family (in particular, her mother) began to make videos of her. Nailah
and other family members contended that Jahi responded to "simple
commands." 2 60 Shewmon reviewed 48 video recordings made by
Jahi's family in order to show that the girl exhibited voluntary
responsiveness. He acknowledged that before reviewing the videos,
he "shared the general skepticism" about the family's reports that Jahi
was capable of voluntary responses. 2 6 1 After watching the videos,
Shewmon revised his initial conclusion that Jahi was unresponsive:
After countless hours studying the videos and taking a devil's
advocate approach at every step, I cannot escape the conclusion
that the alleged responses were genuine.
Some videos seem to demonstrate a surprising degree of
comprehension. For example: extending the thumb upward after
previously flexing it and being told to move it up instead; or

258

Id.

259

Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.

260

261

Shewmon, The Case oflahi McMath, supra note 255, at S74.
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making a stronger repeat arm movement when told to "move it
harder"; or, after a previous motor response when the digits and
hand remained tense, relaxing them quickly upon being told to
relax them .. . These demonstrations were not cherry-picked
coincidences of spontaneous movements because such
262
movements never occurred during baseline periods.

In short, Shewmon concluded in 2017 that Jahi could not be
diagnosed as brain dead. Rather, he described her to have entered a
"'minimally conscious state."' 26 3 Shewmon's conclusion-a result of
Nailah's efforts to prove that her daughter was alive-was stunning.
c.

JahiMcMath: A Family Story

Jahi McMath's story has encouraged re-assessments of the notion
of brain death.264 However, her story was about more than that. Jahi's
story also speaks to a multitude of relationships - within families,
between patients and clinicians, and between patients' family
members and clinicians. It speaks to the personhood of the girl,
herself, and the family that loved her. And it speaks to understandings
of individual autonomy as well as communal autonomy, to the notion
of medical consent, medical assent (sometimes sought from a child),
bias and prejudice in health care, and the role of the law in resolving
complicated medical disputes.
At least three additional narratives about Jahi McMath's situation
supplement the narrative that focuses on the girl's medical condition
and the framework that that condition has provided for reconsidering
diagnoses of brain death. Each of the additional narratives is
important to an understanding of Jahi McMath's life and story, and
each speaks to important challenges in health care and in society,
more broadly. One of these narratives focuses on Jahi's personal story
- the story of an African American teenager who reluctantly
submitted to routine surgery, emerging from that surgery with a brain
death diagnosis. Second, Jahi's story includes a narrative about the
262
263

Id. at S74-S75.
Id. at S75.

264

See Lewis et aL., Shouldn't Deadbe Dead?, supra note 233.
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power of the community to challenge and even, sometimes, to upend
medical and legal determinations. And third, Jahi's story which
includes elements of bias and prejudice-or at least the perception of
bias and prejudice by members of the girl's family-includes a
narrative about unequal treatment in health care. This third narrative
focuses on how bias and prejudice shaped the tone of Jahi's story as
well, perhaps, as its outcome. This Section considers each of these
narratives, in turn.

i.

Jahi, the person

Jahi was only 13 when she received a brain death diagnosis. But,
even as a young adolescent, she had a distinct personality and
character. Jahi told a classmate that she liked science, wanted to
become a physician, to marry, and to have twins. 2 65 She is described
as having been considerate, friendly, and strong-willed. 266 Even as a
child, Jahi had a clear sense of her own preferences and was ready to
make them known, when asked. 267 One of Jahi's preferences, which
haunted her mother later, was to avoid the proposed surgery which
had been recommended to correct her sleep apnea. 268 When Jahi met
with the surgeon before the surgery, she queried him about his
credentials and experience and asked if he had had adequate sleep
during the night before her surgery. 2 69
At the same time, according to her mother, Jahi was an anxious
child who worried about matters such as wars coming to the United

265 Rachel Swan, Outpouring of griefat Jahi's memorial; Oakland girl buried almost 5
years after being ruled brain-dead, S.F. CHRONICLE (Jul. 7, 2018), https://www.pressreader.com
/usa/san-francisco-chronicle-late-edition/20180707/textview.
266 See generally Aviv, supra note 137 (reporting that Jahi's school mates teased her for
being "'chunky,"' but "she absorbed the insults without protest.").
267
See id.
268 Scott Herhold, At bottom, the Jahi McMath story is a tale of a mother's guilt, THE
MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.mercurynews.com/2013/12/26/herhold-atbottom-the-jahi-mcmath-story-is-a-tale-of-a-mothers-guilt/. Nailah is reported to have said: "'It
was me. It was all me. . . .'she didn't do it. She just followed what I said. So, I feel like it would
be so wrong of me to let them pull that plug on her."' Id.
269 Aviv, supra note 137.
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States. 270 She was shy, 27 1 and she submitted to teasing and bullying
from schoolmates (mostly because of her weight) without any
outward response. 2 7 2 Nailah worried that Jahi would let people take
advantage of her.273 Thus, not unlike many adolescents, Jahi
combined strength and fragility, and she combined the ability to
challenge authority with a shy submissiveness.
Jahi attended a charter school in East Oakland, California. There,
she hoped to become a cheerleader. 274 Most of the students at the
school came from low-income families, and most identified as
Christian, as did Jahi's family. 275After Jahi's brain death diagnosis,
the school's administration informed Jahi's schoolmates that she
277
Jahi's
could well be alive. 27 6 They responded by praying for her.
278 Her siblings
siblings attended the same school that she attended.
2 79 Her
and friends characterized her as "quiet," yet always helpful.
family called her "Mama Jahi" because she helped her younger
siblings with their daily needs. 280 Nailah declared that her daughter's
28 1
Jahi's favorite color was
name - Jahi - means "known by many."
purple. At her funeral in California in 2018, Nailah and other

See id.
271 See Matthias Gafni, Oakland: Emotional letter from Jahi McMath's mom to keep
daughter 'warm,' CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Dec. 21, 2013), https://web.archive.org/web
/20141008045341/http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_24773831/oakland[hereinafter Gafni, Emotional
emotional-letter-from-Jahi-mcmaths-mom-keep?source-pkg
270

Letter].
272 See Julia Prodis Sulek, Jahi McMath: A mother's undeniable love is lost in divisive
24

battle, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 24, 2013), https://www.mercurynews.com/2013/12/
/jahi-mcmath-a-mothers-undeniable-love-is-lost-in-divisive-battle/.
273 See id.
274 Lisa Fernandez, Friends Believe Jahi McMath, "Quiet Leader, " is Alive, NBC (BAY
AREA) (Nov. 30, 2019), https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/jahi-mcmath-brain-death79 7 3
0 /.
tonsillectomy-ec-reems-academy-friends-believe-alive/
275 Fernandez, supra note 274; Kat Chow, Jahi McMath, Teen at Center of Medical and
Religious Debate on Brain Death, Has Died, NPR (June 29, 2018) https://www.npr.org/2018/06
/29/624641317/jahi-mcmath-teen-at-center-of-medical-and-religious-debate-on-brain-death-hasdi.
276 Chow, supra note 275.
277

Id.

278

Id.
Fernandez, supra note 274.
Sulek, supra note 272.
Gafni, Emotional Letter, supranote 271.

279
280
281
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mourners donned purple outfits. 2 8 2 The casket in which Jahi was
buried was also purple. 2 8 3
Any picture attempting to respond to questions about Jahi's
personhood-the person at the center of this public narrative about a
brain-dead child-must focus also on the girl's family. Much of
Jahi's strength seems to have stemmed from within the supportive
family and community where she was raised. 284 After Jahi's brain
death diagnosis, her family fought both the medical and legal
establishments to have life-sustaining care continued.
ii.

The Force of Community

Soon after Jahi was diagnosed as brain dead, her mother wrote a
letter for public purview that sought communal prayer for Jahi. 285 In
that letter, Nailah pleaded with other mothers to pray for her daughter:
"Hold your children tight. Tell them you love them. I tell my
daughter over and over. I know she can hear me. If she has any
brain activity when they do the independent tests she will be kept
alive. Pray for my daughter Jahi, pray that she will get better so
they don't kill her. Pray for me, mothers, that my love can bring
286
her life once more."

Nailah's proactive support for her daughter placed her in
opposition to lawyers, hospital administrators, and doctors. In this,
she was herself supported by strong family relationships and by
support from her larger community and from strangers throughout the
See Swan, supra note 265; see also Gafni, EmotionalLetter, supra note 271.
See Angela Ruggiero & Alison Berg, Jahi McMath: Funeralhonors young teen whose
brain death captured world's attention, E. BAY TIMES (Jul. 6, 2018), https://www.eastbay
times.com/201 8 /07/06/jahi-mcmath-funeral-honors-young-teen-whose-brain-death-capturedworlds-attention/#:-:text-Jahi%20McMath%3A%2OFuneral%20honors%20young%20teen%20
whose%20brain%20death%20captured%20world's%20attention.
284 See Rick Hurd et al., Jahi McMath: Family ready to move brain-dead girl to new facility;
hospital may refuse surgery request, THE MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 26, 2013), https:
//www.mercurynews.com/2013/12/26/jahi-mcmath-family-ready-to-move-brain-dead-girl-tonew-facility-hospital-may-refuse-surgery-request/. Nailah Winkfield received significant support
after Jahi's diagnosis from her Church community. That community participated in a prayer vigil
for the girl soon after Jahi's diagnosis. See id.
285 See Gafni, EmotionalLetter, supra note 271.
282

283

286
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world. In February 2014, Nailah authored a second letter about her
daughter's situation which, again, she made public. 2 8 7 In this letter,
Nailah noted the strong support she received within her family and
from others:
It has been over a month since I have spoken about my life
with Jahi to anyone outside a very small circle of family and
friends. So many people have asked how we are doing ... I have
withdrawn for reasons of safety and privacy and to focus on my
daughter and my role as her mother. However, I have not been
alone. I have been surrounded by the love, support, and prayers
of so many kind people.

On the long hard days when I'm feeling down I think about all
the people who are praying for me and Jahi and I feel so much
288
better. I want you to know that I'm praying for you as well.

Throughout, Nailah received support from her church group in
Oakland. In the days following Jahi's brain death diagnosis, members
of that community participated in protests outside the Oakland
hospital in which Jahi had been declared brain dead. They chanted
"'Don't pull the plug! "'289
In 2018, more than four years later, Jahi's funeral was held at the
Acts Full Gospel Church in Oakland, California. About 200 people
grieved with Nailah and other family members. 2 90 At the funeral,
congregants gave Nailah a standing ovation. 29 1 Nailah told the
assembled mourners what she wanted to say to Jahi: "I am so proud
of you. Because you did not let that hospital take you out, you left on
your own." 29 2
Nailah's language suggests the level of support that she and other
members of Jahi's immediate family provided during the time
287 See Staff Reports, JahiMcMath: Complete text of letterfrom brain-deadgirl's mother,
THE MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.mercurynews.com/2014/02/20/jahi-memathcomplete-text-of-letter-from-brain-dead-girls-mother/.
288

289
290

Id.

See Swan, supra note 265.
See Ruggiero, supra note 283.
291 See McMath's mom slams docs at funeral, DAILY POST (Jul. 7, 2018), https:
//plus.lexis.com/api/permalink/d9fb6b63-afl 2-4476-985f-df474c6ee546/?context-1530671.
292 Ruggiero, supra note 283.
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between the girl's death in California and her death in New Jersey.
Nailah and her husband, Marvin Winkfield (Jahi's stepfather)
brought Jahi to New Jersey in early 2014. Nailah sold her home, gave
up her job, and spent most of her days with Jahi between 2014 and
Jahi's death, pursuant to New Jersey law, in 2018.293 Once Nailah
arrived in New Jersey to be with Jahi, she lamented that she "had no
plan, no place to live, no nothing," but in explanation, she described
her commitment to Jahi: "'when it comes to my kid, I'm an
animal."'294 Then, after Jahi's death, Nailah could not imagine a life
without her daughter: "[E]verything I did revolved around Jahi" ..
"I want to paint her nails, and I want to comb her hair and brush her
teeth and talk to her and watch TV with her and let her know what's
on TV. And I can't do that no more" ... .295
Jahi's uncle, grandmother, and siblings also actively helped care
for Jahi after her 2013 surgery. And Milton McMath, Jahi's biological
father, declared that he would never "give up on Jahi, period.. .I will
pull a trigger on myself before I pull the plug on her." 296
When Jahi experienced severe post-operative bleeding after the
2013 surgery, Nailah called her mother, Sandra Chatman, who was
instrumental in notifying clinicians about Jahi's deteriorating
condition - though to virtually no avail until the girl went into cardiac
arrest. At that point, clinicians recognized that the girl was dying and
initiated a Code. 29 7 While resuscitation efforts were underway, a
nurse on the unit is reported to have said to Sandra that she "knew
this would happen," suggesting that Jahi's condition had not been
attended to appropriately.298

293 See Joseph Geha, OfJahiMcMath, mom says: 'Thatlittle black girlfrom Oaklandmade
history', E. BAY TIMES (Jul. 4, 2018), https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2018/07/03/of-jahimcmath-mom-says-that-1 ittle-black-girl-from-oakland-made-history/.
294 Aviv, supranote 137.
295

Id

296 Yanan Wang, JahiMcMath: Familyfights over 'healthyand beautiful' daughter legally
dead since 2013; In legal terms, the 15-year-old girl is no longer alive, but on life support her
organs continue to function, THE INDEPENDENT (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.independent.co.uk
/news/world/americas/jahi-mcmath-family-fights-on-over-healthy-and-beautiful-daughter-

legally-dead-since-2013-a6950001.html.
297 See Aviv, supra note 137.
298 Bay Area News Group, Jahi McMath lawsuit: Timeline of events at UCSF Benioff
Children's Hospital Oakland, CHICO ENTER.-REC. (Apr. 21, 2018) https://www.chicoer.com
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After Jahi's brain death diagnosis, Jahi's uncle Omari Sealey
(Nailah's brother) slept in Jahi's hospital room while she remained at
299
Children's Hospital Oakland, connected to ventilatory support. He
300 Omari was a former
feared that "the hospital could 'kill her off.'
star athlete at a California state university. He had a substantial
following on social media. 30 1 In a 2013 interview with CNN, Omari
wore a purple t-shirt because Jahi loved the color. It read: "Team
Jahi." Through his many contacts, Omari found Christopher Dolan,
the attorney who represented the family pro bono until after Jahi's
funeral in California in 2018.302
iii.

Bias and Prejudice

Bais and prejudice form the third component of Jahi's story. This
component involves both bias and prejudice toward Jahi and her
family. Both aspects of this component are most likely to involve
hospital healthcare professionals. Law professor Michelle Goodwin
suggested that comprehending Jahi's story as a context for
reevaluating brain death while "ignor[ing] the underlying medical
treatment, which resulted in her dire status, is not only a folly but also
renders her an object." "Arguably," continued Goodwin,
"circumscribing Jahi McMath's life status to a question of brain death
fails to acknowledge and respond to a chronic, if uncomfortable,
bioethics problem in American health care - namely, racial bias and
3 03
unequal treatment, both real and perceived."
Clinicians' responses (or more accurately, non-responses) to
Jahi's deteriorating condition in the period immediately following her
/2015/03/03/j ahi-mcmath-lawsuit-timeline-of-events-at-ucsf-benioff-childrens-hospitaloakland/.
299 Samantha Schmidt, Jahi McMath, The Calif girl in life-support controversy, is now
dead, WASH. POST (Jun. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp
/2018/06/29/jahi-mcmath-the-calif-girl-declared-brain-dead-4-years-ago-is-taken-off-lifesupport!.
300 Id.

301 See Aviv, supra note 137.
302 See Examiner Staff, A personalstory of JahiMcMath, SF EXAMINER (Dec. 25, 2013),
https://www.sfexaminer.com/features/a-personal-story-of-representing-jahi-mcmath
/?oid52658052.
303 Michelle Goodwin, Revisiting Death: Implicit Bias and the Case of Jahi McMath, 48
Hastings Cent. Rpt S77, S78 (2018).
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surgery are of particular concern. Both Nailah and Sandra wondered
what role Jahi and the family's race played in the hospital's treatment
and response to Jahi's post-surgery complications. 304 Each matterthe care that Jahi received and clinicians' responses to the family-is
described in detail in Milton McMath's complaint to a California state
court, seeking, alternatively, damages for Jahi's compromised brain
function or for the girl's wrongful death. 3 05
As described in McMath's complaint, when Nailah was first
permitted to see her daughter post-surgery, she found her child
"coughing up blood." 3 06 A nurse informed Nailah that this was not
unusual. The nurse then told Nailah how to suction blood from the
child's mouth. Nailah continued to suction blood for about an hour
when a second nurse criticized her for potentially suctioning blood
clots needed for healing. 307 The child's bandages and material
packing her nose became increasingly wet with blood. Nailah asked
for a doctor to examine her daughter. No doctor came. As the child's
bleeding grew more severe, Nailah's worry turned to fear. She
contacted her mother, Sandra Chatman, a nurse. Chatman arrived at
the hospital at about 10 p.m. She was "alarmed" by what she found. 308
Chatman soon concluded that Jahi "was at risk of having serious
medical complications from the loss of blood and the lack of medical
care." 309 She called for help when Jahi's complications grew more
worrisome still. 3 10 McMath reported that no one responded or
considered Chatman's concerns real. 31' She continued to meet with a
lack of concern from the nursing staff. 312 No physicians arrived to
examine the child. 313 One doctor who stood in the pediatric intensive

304

305
306
307
308
309
310

See Aviv, supra note 137.
See Complaint at 4, McMath v. Rosen, No. RG15796121 (Super. Ct. Cal., Dec. 9, 2015).
Id at 3.
See id.
Id. at 4.

Id
Id

311 See Richard Alleyne, EXCLUSIVE - 'Ithurts so Bad': Devastated grandmother reveals
the last words of Jahi Mc Math before routine tonsil operation left her brain dead, MAIL ONL[NE
(Jan. 1, 2014), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2532210/I-told-OK-Grandmotherdevastated-final-words-teenager-moments-routine-tonsil-operation-left-ife-support.html.
312 See Complaint at 4, McMath v. Rosen, No. RG15796121 (Super. Ct. Cal., Dec. 9, 2015).
313 See id.; see also Aviv, supra note 137.
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care unit at the time ignored Sandra and told the on-duty nurse not to
change Jahi's robe so that the amount of blood loss could be
discerned. 3 14 To Sandra, this doctor appeared to be "'all frowned up
were dirt."' 3 15
with his arms crossed. . . It was like he thought we
Sandra's efforts to get clinical help for her granddaughter were
effective only after the girl suffered a cardiac arrest and was clearly
dying. Then, a Code was called. 316 At that time, a physician finally
came to Jahi's bedside. Sandra heard him say, "Shit, her heart
stopped." Attempts to revive the child left her in a severely
compromised condition; two days later she was declared brain
dead.317
The nurse responsible for Jahi during the night following the girl's
surgery entered a note in the child's chart which read: "This writer
was informed there would be no immediate intervention from ENT
or Surgery. Brain tests administered during the course of the
following two days indicated "severe brain damage."318 On
December 12, three days after the tonsillectomy, hospital personnel
informed Jahi's mother and stepfather that the hospital had put the
girl on a donor list and that life support would be withdrawn by the
following morning. 3 19
Nailah reported that her questions about her daughter's situation
were left unanswered. 320 Yet, she faced increasing pressure to consent
to Jahi's becoming an organ donor. The family requested another
medical opinion. The hospital's Chief of Pediatrics rejected the
request and reportedly exclaimed: "'What don't you understand? She
is dead, dead, dead."' By this point, Nailah had lost faith in the
Oakland's Children's Hospital and in its clinicians. Christopher
Dolan, Nailah's attorney, quoted her to have explained:
"I brought her in here for a simple operation, I trusted you.
Now you tell me she is dead. I can touch her, she is warm and
soft. She is not cold and stiff like death. She smells good and
314
315
316

See Aviv, supra note 137.

Id.

317

See Complaint at 4, McMath v. Rosen, No. RG15796121 (Super. Ct. Cal., Dec. 9, 2015).
See id. at 5.

318

Id.
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Id.
See id.
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when I rub her feet she pulls away. I know my daughter, she's
not dead. She needs time, I need time. She is my baby, you can't
take her. You did this to her, you owe her some time to get
better." 32 1

The hospital administration reportedly had security guards follow
Jahi's family members after the hospital challenged the diagnosis of
brain death. At the same time, hospital personnel continued to
pressure the family to consent to the child's becoming an organ
donor. 322 Chatman concluded that the hospital clinicians were simply
"heartless." 3 2 3
There are almost no public documents that definitively confirm the
accuracy of the claims in Milton McMath's complaint. But there is
nothing that contradicts them. 3 2 4 Even if some of the facts reported
could be interpreted variously, Mr. McMath's assertions suggest the
family's understanding of what had happened to them and to 13-yearold Jahi and its deep discontent with the manner in which hospital
personnel had treated them. 325
By the time that the hospital declared Jahi brain dead, the family
did not believe that hospital administrators or clinicians could be
trusted. Sandra reported that an African American physician, who had
asked the hospital to provide Jahi's family with a little more time,
requested an opportunity to speak privately with Sandra. She
reportedly told Sandra that the child would look bad at her funeral if
left on the ventilator much longer. "You know how we are," Sandra
reports her having said. 326 Sandra wondered to whom the "we"
referred:

321 Examiner Staff, supra note 302.
322 See Complaint at 6, McMath v. Rosen, No. RG15796121 (Super. Ct. Cal., Dec. 9, 2015)
(the complaint further reports that requests to Nailah Winkfield for Jahi's organs for donation
were made to her even as she sat in the hospital chapel, praying for her daughter's life).
323 Alleyne, supra note 311.
324 In a New Yorker article, Rachel Aviv reported on interactions in the hospital between
Jahi's family members and hospital clinicians and other personnel on the day or two following
Jahi's surgery. Her account harmonizes with that of Mr. McMath's complaint. The New Yorker
article does not provide footnote support for the account offered. See Aviv, supra note 137.
325 See id. (note ways in which actively involved hospital ethicists could have responded to
the family's concerns).
326 Id. (Aviv reports that the physician in question did not accept Sandra's characterization
of their discussion).
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"'We African Americans? I felt so belittled. Yes, a lot of black
children die in Oakland and people do have funerals for their
children-but that don't mean all of us are like that. Do you think
we're supposed to be used to our children dying, that this is just
32 7
what black people normally go through?"'

Jahi's mother later told a New Yorker reporter that she wondered
what lay behind the hospital's responses to her child: "'No one was
listening to us, and I can't prove it, but I really feel in my heart: if
Jahi was a little white girl, I feel we would have gotten a little more
no
help and attention."'328 The family felt that they received
3 29
Jahi's
compassion from the hospital administration or clinicians.
ideally,
would,
who
ethicists
story demanded the attention of hospital
have discussed the family's concerns with them and would have
facilitated communication between Jahi's family and her clinicians.
That seems not to have happened. A hospital Medical Ethics
Committee did apparently review the hospital's decision not to
continue life-sustaining care for Jahi and concluded that that decision
"that
also concluded
appropriate. The Committee
was
raised
care]
continuing
[for
requests
family's
accommodating the
"significant concerns of justice and fairness"' and could establish "a
330 These conclusions did not
troubling precedent for the future."
bridge the painful gap that had developed between Jahi's family and
her clinicians and did not help the family respond to their shock and
grief in the weeks following Jahi's brain death diagnosis. Welltrained ethicists, ready to devote the time needed to this case might
even have precluded the subsequent litigation between Jahi's family
and the hospital. Indeed, Sandra wondered, later, whether the family
"would ... have fought so much" if they had been treated with more
33 1
respect by hospital personnel.
In addition, the family's loss of trust in hospital personnel may
have been exacerbated by knowledge of a long history of disrespect
within the medical and scientific establishments for African
327

Id.

Id.
See id.
330 Christopher M. Burkle et al., Why brain death is considered death and why there should
be no confusion, 83 NEUROLOGY 1464, 1467-68 (2014).
331 Aviv, supra note 137.
328
329
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American patients and research subjects. In the United States, African
Americans had often been used and abused as experimental subjects,
frequently without consent. 33 2 Moreover, bias and prejudice have
affected medical care in clinical settings. 3 3 3 Yolanda Wilson, a
philosopher at Howard University, believes that this history helps
explain the incredulity of Jahi's family about the level of medical care
that the girl received, about hospital responses to them after Jahi's
brain death diagnosis, and about motivations behind that diagnosis. 3 3 4
In Wilson's view, the discriminatory treatment to which the family
believed that it had been subjected, increased their pain and grief.3 35
A history of distrust, in John Paris's words, was "on full display at
community-organized demonstrations outside Oakland Children's
Hospital" 3 3 6 in the days following Jahi's final diagnosis there:
"Accusations were made that the hospital disrespected the family,
portrayed the parents as 'ignorant,' and 'wanted a quick end to Jahi's
life' to limit malpractice costs. The fact that the oxygenated body
appeared 'warm and alive' rather than 'cold and dead' created a
problem of perception." 3 3 7
IV.

The Law and the Media: What Made a Difference for
Elizabeth Bouvia and Jahi McMath?

The legal cases initiated by Bouvia and by McMath's family were
at least as significant as pivots around which media reported these
stories of death and dying as they were in directing the course of
events for either Elizabeth Bouvia or Jahi McMath. In some part, this
media attention may have reflected the appeal of "damsels in
332 See Yolonda Wilson, Why the case ofJahi Mc Math is importantfor understandingthe
role ofracefor black patients, THE CONVERSATION (Jul. 12, 2018), https://theconversation.com
/why-the-case-of-jahi-mcmath-is-important-for-understanding-the-role-of-race-for-blackpatients-99353 (referring to the gynecological experiments of J. Marion Sims in the nineteenth
century, to the decades-long Tuskegee study, sponsored by the U.S. Public Health Service, and to
the robbery of bodies from cemeteries in which African Americans were buried, among other
matters).
333 See id. (noting that this has resulted in "patient anxiety, as well as lower engagement in
health care decision-making between patient and provider").
334 See id.
335 See id.
336 Paris, supra note 204, at 378.
337

Id.
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distress." Both Bouvia and McMath were young-the first a young
woman, the second a teenager-and both (or more accurately, Bouvia
and McMath's family) refused to live or die in a manner expected of
them by the law and by medicine.
a.

Practical, Social, and Ideological Implications of
Legal Holdings Regarding Bouvia and McMath

The first time that Elizabeth Bouvia asked a court to order
clinicians to withdraw tubes supplying her with nutrition and
hydration and thus to facilitate Bouvia's expressed wish to die, the
court refused to do that. 3 38 But three years later, when Bouvia went
to court for a second time, a California appellate court granted her the
right to exercise her preference for death over life, understanding the
withdrawal of food and water by hospital clinicians while Bouvia
remained a patient in the hospital, as tantamount to any patient's
3 39
refusing to accept recommended medical care.
Bouvia and her attorneys had re-shaped her claims to facilitate
this understanding. When she first sought judicial assistance in the
early 1980s, Bouvia stated that she hoped to die from starvation. In
1985, when she went to court for a second time, she claimed that she
wanted only to make medical decisions for herself, including
34 0 The shift in
decisions about assisted hydration and nutrition.
language mitigated focus on the implications of asking clinicians to
assist in Bouvia's death.
In 1985, when Elizabeth Bouvia attempted for the second time to
gain legal authorization to stay in a public hospital while refusing lifesustaining care, American society had begun seriously to contemplate

See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
339 See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
340 See Marcia Chambers, Woman Who Fought To Die Is Back In Court, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 9, 1986), https://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/09/us/woman-who-fought-to-die-is-back-incourt.html;
338
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legalizing a right to assisted suicide. 34 1 The appellate court's 1986
decision seemed to support arguments in favor of that right.3 4 2
However, for Bouvia, herself, the court's decision did not lead to
her death. She decided not to take advantage of the right that the court
extended to her. 3 4 3 Yet, the many news articles about Bouvia's
request and the courts' responses brought significant public attention
to the so-called "right to die" with physician assistance. 344
Bouvia's legal cases also brought public attention to social
understandings of people with disabilities. That attention defined
conflicting visions of disability. The courts that entertained Bouvia's
cases tended to view her situation as calling for heroism or pity.34 5
But disability rights activists contended, in sharp contrast, that that
view was deeply biased and harmful to people with disabilities. 34 6
The legal proceedings that surrounded Jahi McMath's case did not
change state law. 3 4 7 However, the public media presentations and
scholarly analyses of the case that reported on and interpreted the
legal proceedings did influence some lawmakers and medical
clinicians to reconsider the implications of a brain death diagnosis. 348
They also focused attention on the perception of Jahi's family that
they, and Jahi, had been the targets of biased responses, particularly
from hospital personnel. 349
341 See also How Death with Dignity Laws Work, DEATH WITH DIGNITY (last accessed Sep.
28, 2021), https://deathwithdignity.org/learn/access/ (Oregon first granted the right to assisted
suicide through a voter initiative in 1994. By 2021, other states that had passed laws providing for
physician assistance with dying include California, Colorado, the D.C., Hawaii, Maine, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, vermont, and Washington).
342 Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. at 1147 (Compton, J., concurring).
343
See supra Section III (A) and accompanying text. This is not to contend that the legal
case held no consequences for Bouvia, only that it held no consequences insofar as the law which
she contested had precluded her from starving to death, but when given that right, she turned it
down. It is possible, if not likely, that Bouvia gained a great deal from the legal proceedings that
she initiated - in particular, the fact of having been witnessed.
344 Bouvia's story occurred before the Internet. Thus, there were fewer avenues for
discussion of her story than were available when McMath was declared brain dead. Still, however,
there were scores of news stories and law review articles that discussed Bouvia's case. See infra
Section V(B) (noting results of search).
345 See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
346 See supranote 42-3 and accompanying text; infra notes 373-380 and accompanying text.
347 See supra subsection IV(A) (discussing legal proceedings relevant to Jahi McMath).
348 A July 2021 search (July 20, 2021) revealed thousands of relevant studies about Jahi
McMath's situation; see supra note 17; see also Section V.
349 See supra notes 323-337.
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For Jahi McMath's family, the law was not directly helpful except
35 0 which made
insofar as courts encouraged a negotiated agreement,
a significant practical difference for Jahi's family. That agreement
resulted in Jahi's mother gaining custody of Jahi's body for transport
to New Jersey. 35 1 In the years during which Jahi was in New Jersey,
her story was reviewed again and again. That attention did make a
difference in views of brain death.3 52
When Jahi was initially transferred to New Jersey, the facility's
website declared that Jahi "has been defined as a deceased person, yet
she has all of the functional attributes of a living person despite her
brain injury." 353 Robert Truog, a bioethicist and pediatrician, noted
the comment of one "prominent bioethicist [who] quipped: 'You
can't really feed a corpse."' 35 4 Truog added: "This is correct, of
course, but given that McMath and other brain-dead patients can not
only be fed, but can digest the food, excrete wastes, and grow and
develop, he [the bioethicist] was unwittingly undermining his own
position." 35 5
Soon after McMath's surgery and the declaration that she was
brain dead, a number of bioethicists criticized the family and others
who insisted on treating Jahi as a living child. Lawrence McCullough
at the Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy at Baylor College
of Medicine in Houston commented that the medical facility that had
accepted Jahi's body must have been suffering from "'disordered"'
thinking "'from a medical point of view.. . .There is a word for this:

350 That agreement was facilitated by state and federal courts. See supra notes 149-80 and
accompanying text.
351 In the eyes of the family, they gained custody of Jahi, herself- a living child. See supra
note 173-189 and accompanying text.
352 Law review articles looked to McMath's situation to suggest an ambiguity at the center
of the notion of brain death. See, e.g., Ben Nipper, Comment & Note, Legislating Death: A Review
andProposedRefinement of the Uniform Determination of Death Act, 17 Hous. J. HEALTH L.
POL'Y 429, 453 (2017); Seema K. Shah, Article: Piercingthe Veil: The Limits of Brain Death as
a Legal Fiction,48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 301, 306 (2015); Robert D. Truog, Symposium: Science
Challengesfor Law and Policy: Defining Death: Getting It Wrong for All the Right Reasons, 93
TEx. L. REV. 1885, 1897 (2015).
353 Truog, supra note 352, at 1895.
354 Id at 1896.
355 Id. (citing Margaret Lock, TWICE DEAD: ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND THE REINVENTION
OF DEATH, 243-44 (2002)).
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crazy. "'356 Arthur Caplan opined that the girl's physicians in New
Jersey were "trying to ventilate and otherwise treat a corpse. "35 By
2018, when Jahi was declared dead in New Jersey, according to
cardio-pulmonary criteria, scholarly discussion and legal debate had,
in some part, shifted gears on the matter of brain death.358 Law
professor Thadeus Pope contented in 2018 that critics of the notion
of brain death had begun to
us[e] the courts to successfully challenge prevailing and longstanding brain death principles. In other words, what has long
been an intellectual and scholarly debate is now increasingly
framed as a question of law and public policy. The legal status
of brain death is no longer merely a subject for more scrutiny and
deliberation. It is now a target for fundamental reassessment of
settled practices. 359

Yet, for the McMath family, their ability to transport Jahi to New
Jersey was a matter of central importance. In New Jersey, Jahi was
fed and ventilated for more than four years. This arrangement was the
result of the family's concerted and pro-active insistence that Jahi's
brain had been injured, but that she was not dead.360
b.

Autonomy and Community

The contrast between Elizabeth Bouvia's separation from
community sharply distinguishes her story from that of Jahi, whose
family stressed community rather than autonomy. Together, these
cases present a challenging stage on which to consider the
comparative importance of autonomy and community in bioethical
debate. Perhaps too often, bioethicists have invoked the notion of
individual autonomy in describing and responding to patients' ethical

356 Liz Szabo, Ethicists criticizetreatment of brain-deadpatients, NAT'L. CATH. REP. (Jan.
10, 2014).
357

Id

358 See, e.g., Pope, supra note 218, at 267-68 (noting that in the previous couple of years
"the slow simmer of an academic debate" about brain death had "begun to boil over into a legal
conflagration.").
359 Id. at 268.
360 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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challenges. Failure to understand the power of community as a
balance to autonomy has limited bioethical debate.
Even as hospital bioethicists have stressed the patient's right to
autonomy in clinical care, they have noted the potential conflict
between autonomy and clinician beneficence - the obligation of
clinicians to serve their patients' best interests. One law professor,
himself a physician and an attorney, asserted that "at some point" the
36 1
Perhaps
two values are bound to conflict with each other.
underlying the conflict between autonomy and beneficence sits a
more profound divergence between autonomy and community. The
implications of this underlying conflict reflect shifts in the Western
social order, beginning during the second half of the twentieth
century.
Before the 1960s, American culture largely separated everyday
life into two domains - the marketplace and the personal arena (e.g.,
the family). 36 2 Different values governed and characterized each
domain. At work, people functioned as autonomous individuals, free
(often in theory more than in fact) to negotiate and re-negotiate the
terms of their employment. At home, people valued a social
hierarchy, organized in terms of status and attendant roles. As society
viewed money to govern at work, so it viewed love to define the home
and hearth. 363 That social order began openly too far apart by the
1960s, and by the start of the twenty-first century, the values that once
separated work from home had largely merged. 364 The intimate
community that once characterized (or more accurately, was expected
to characterize) the family had been replaced-at least with regard to
adults-with negotiated arrangements that endured only as long as
3 65
Yet, the values of the
the parties involved chose to stay connected.
traditional family have not disappeared entirely, and there remains a
significant yearning for the presumptive trust, shared values, and
361 Brian Liang, Bouvia v. SuperiorCourt: Quality of Life Matters, 7 ETHICS J OF THE AMA
(Feb. 2005).
362 See Janet L. Dolgin, The Familyin Transition:From Griswoldto Eisenstadtand Beyond,
82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1525 (1994) (the domain of family was often conflated with that of church).
363 See id. at 1551.
364 See Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102
COLUM. L. REv. 337, 347-348 (2002).
365

See id. at 340.
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support offered by the community. At least to some extent, Elizabeth
Bouvia's story stands for autonomy and Jahi McMath's story stands
for community.
As an adult, Bouvia lived alone, largely without strong communal
associations, but surrounded by hospital clinicians and staff. That
seems to have been her preference. 366 In court, she asked for the right
to have her "choice" to die with the assistance of hospital clinicians
respected by the law and thus by her treating clinicians. In a statement
that Bouvia released through Richard Scott, her attorney, she declared
that "'as an individual," she had "the right to make an individual
choice with regard to [her] own future."' 367 Bouvia expressly rejected
the opportunity to become involved with members of the disability
rights community:
"I am aware that many disabled people volunteered to come to
Riverside to talk to me about my decision and about other
options. While I appreciate those offers, I do not wish to accept
them. I wish to re-emphasize that I reviewed my alternatives, and
that I now simply wish to be left alone. This is a personal and
very private decision, which I have made after long and careful
thought." 368

Autonomy does not necessarily suggest aloneness. In bioethical
discourse, autonomy is only rarely connected expressly with
aloneness or loneliness. Yet, American society has witnessed
increasing stress on autonomy, especially in family life and in
healthcare relationships, in the last six decades, and at the same time,
communal relationships have become less accessible to many
people.369 Jahi McMath's story defies this pattern. The power of the
familial community and of the larger community that surrounded and
supported Jahi's family go far toward explaining the family's success
in arranging for Jahi to receive life-sustaining care for over four years

366

At any rate, Bouvia claimed that this was her choice. See generally Johnson, supranote

367

368

Johnson, supra note 38.
Id. (quoting from statements that Elizabeth Bouvia gave to Richard Scott).

369

See Robert D. Putnam, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REvIvAL OF AMERICAN

38.

COMMUNITY, 252 (Simon and Schuster, 2000) (examining disengagement of Americans from
communal activities since start of 1950s).
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370
Public media
after the girl was declared brain dead in California.
focused on the notion of brain death, on conflicts between one family
and the medico-legal establishments, and on Jahi's unrelenting family
support. This brought widespread attention to the family's cohesive
commitment to, and success in, sustaining Jahi's care between late2013 when she died in California, and mid-2018 when she died in
California. Aspects of Jahi's story present a model that bioethicists
might heed. Autonomy needs to be balanced not only against
beneficence but, as well, against the preservation of communal
relationships within the society and, more specifically, within the
world of health care.

c.

Law, Medicine, Media, and Bias

Both the story of Elizabeth Bouvia and that of Jahi McMath have
informed lawmakers, medical clinicians, and the public on the
implications of withdrawing life-sustaining care - in the first case for
a patient who requested the cessation of such care, and in the second
case, for a patient deemed brain dead whose family resisted that
diagnosis. Each case has stimulated public debate about death and
dying and about the role of bias in the context of decisions about death
and dying.
Several dozen subsequent legal cases3 7 1 have cited Bouvia v.
Superior Court, decided in 1986, often for the proposition that a
competent patient has the right to refuse recommended medical
treatment. 372 Further, the stories about Bouvia that supported and
then developed out of the legal cases have stimulated continuing
37 3 News stories about
responses from disability-rights activists.
370

See supra Section IV(C) and accompanying text.
371 See e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 1996)
(O'Scannlan, J., dissenting); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990)
(citing Quinlan for proposition that competent patient "generally possesses the right not to
consent, that is, to refuse treatment"); Conservatorshipof Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 846 (Cal.
App. 6d 1988) (citing Bouvia for proposition that clinicians are obliged to respect the refusal of
care if requested by a competent patient).
372 Bouvia, 179 Cal. App.3d at 1141.
3?3 See William R. Macklin, Disability-rights activists answer right-to-die comment with
protest: Members fighting to show they aren't a drain on society, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Sep.
26, 1999), https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I0cb92c00fb6d11dab68Ie9ec8c7fd03c/View
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Bouvia's legal cases appeared when she first sought assistance in
court and continued for years after that.374 Early on, Bouvia appeared
on the evening news and was the subject of many news articles.
Many of these stories reflected a significant bias toward people
with disabilities. A number of stories about Bouvia's situation,
published in the 1980s, appeared under disconcerting headlines (e.g.,
"Quadriplegic Loses in Court Again," 375 "Suicide Banned for
Quadriplegic" 3 76 and "Life of Agony" 377). In 1984, a law review
article about Bouvia's story reported that public presentations about
Bouvia often reflected serious biases:
The manner in which the story was presented reflected
attitudes the general public holds toward disability..
Rather than address the social or political implications of the
case, ...
media coverage merely reflected images many
nondisabled people have about what it would be like to be
disabled. Society still sees disability as a very unfortunate
situation, in fact, it is often seen as one of the worst things that
can happen to an individual. Society feels sorry for Bouvia, the
generic pity that it feels for all disabled people. 3 78

Yet, some stories about Bouvia in the years after she brought her
case to court aimed to reveal the biases that undergirded responses to
her and to encourage society, generally, to rethinkbiases about people
with disabilities. A 1984 story (written between Bouvia's first court
case and her second) described her as living in "Southern California,"
"taking regular nourishment," and "'waiting for a better opportunity"
to stop eating. 3 7 9 The piece noted that disability rights activists
/FullText.html?transitionType=UniqueDocltem&contextData=(sc.Default)&userEnteredCitation
=1999+WLNR+7721289&reason=1011 &OWSessionld=5d77baab90a94de99ef4df0485785d76
&firstPage-true&bhcp=1&ignorebhwarn=IgnoreWarns&CobaltRefresh=13216.
374 See Stradley, supra note 52, at 422.
375 Murray Dubin, Quadriplegic Loses in Court Again Calif Supreme Court Rejects
Starvation Suicide, PHILA. INQUIRER (Jan. 20, 1984), available in WestLaw Edge at 1984 WLNR
160824.
376 United Press International, Suicide Banned For Quadriplegic, PHILA. DAILY News (Jan.
20, 1984), available in WestLaw Edge at 1984 WLNR 10021.
377 See generally Stradley, supra note 52, at 422.
378 Id.
379 Jay Arnold, Elizabeth Bouvia, the quadriplegic who quietly left a hospital seven months
after a futile battle for the right to starve to death, is in failing health waiting for "a better
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claimed that assisting Elizabeth in a wish to die was "criminal and
dangerous," particularly because she had not been given a chance to

live a full and dignified life. 380

Over a decade after the California appellate court granted
Elizabeth the right to refuse assisted nutrition and hydration (in
1986),381 Diane Coleman, founder of Not Dead Yet (a disabilityrights organization), traced her own pro-active stance in the
protection of people with disabilities back to Bouvia's case,
explaining that the appellate court decision "paved the way for
abuse." 382 A news article, printed a year earlier, also referencing
Bouvia's case, focused on the fear of members of Not Dead Yet that
a "'right' to die can become a 'duty' to die." 383 Some people working
to advance the disability rights platform viewed Bouvia as "a sort of
3 84
reverse poster child" for disability rights advocates.
Similarly, Jahi McMath's story received widespread attention in
public media. Stories about Jahi's evolving situation brought renewed
attention to the challenging implications of brain death diagnoses.
Some media stories also focused attention on the role of biases in
health care. In Jahi's story, bias has been identified not so much in
judicial responses to the family's requests, but in responses from
hospital clinicians and administrators to Jahi and to the girl's family
in the days following the brain death diagnosis.
As reported by family members, that treatment lacked
compassion. As the girl began to bleed profusely and Jahi's family
members sought assistance for her, nurses were lackadaisical and
almost no doctors responded at all. 385 One physician, on the other side
of the ICU from Jahi's bed, hardly responded to Sandra's queries. To

opportunity to die, " her attorney said., AP ONLINE (Nov. 12, 1984) (quoting Bouvia's attorney,
Richard Scott).
380 Id. (quoting Disability Rights Coordinating Council).
381 Bouvia, 179 Cal. App.3d, at 1144.
382 Macklin, supra note 373 (Macklin references alternative views. Prof. Andrew Batavia,
himself disabled, viewed the positions of Not Dead Yet as paternalistic, saying that disabled
people should be allowed to decide whether to live or die, much as everyone else).
Erin Hoover Barnett, Not Dead Yet Wants to Expand Suicide Debate, THE OREGONIAN
383
(Aug. 1, 1998), https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8fl40elOeO2clldaabafec86ceb66blc
/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS-cbltl .0.
384 Beyette, supra note 125.
385 See supra Section IV and accompanying text.
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Sandra, "'[i]t was like he thought we were dirt."' 386 Then, after Jahi's
brain death diagnosis, family members were pressured to consent to
the withdrawal of care, but no one explained to the family what had
happened that resulted in a tonsillectomy leading to brain death;
family members were not permitted to see the girl's medical records;
no one at the hospital apologized, despite requests from the family.
Even more disturbing to the family, social workers pressured the
family to agree to the withdrawal of ventilatory support for Jahi and
asked them to consent to the donation of the girl's organs. 387 Several
days after the brain death diagnosis, the hospital's chief medical
officer dismissed the family's request that the hospital provide Jahi
with a feeding tube; a clinician asked the family what they failed to
comprehend, but clearly not expecting to be queried or to respond to
the family's questions, he continued: "What is it that you don't
understand.... She's dead, dead, dead." 3 8 8
These responses, assuming that the family's reports were
accurate, failed to attend to the needs of a grieving family. They were
inappropriate, at best. Whether such responses to the family reflected
frustration, impatience, or bias is not clear, but the family certainly
thought that the hospital's responses were grounded in bias or
prejudice. They openly wondered whether the treatment provided to
Jahi would have been different-more attentive, more caring-were
Jahi not Black. 389 Whatever the explanation-and Nailah's
explanation (that Jahi and her family's skin color shaped responses)
may be the right one 3 9 0-the treatment that the hospital and its
clinicians reportedly offered to this girl and her family was harsh,
even unseemly.

Aviv, supra note 137.
387 Id. (Marvin Winkfield, Jahi's stepfather, thought, when the family was asked to donate
the girl's organs that the request was unacceptable in light of the lack of information that had been
given to the family. He reported later: "'We were like..., 'Nah' . . . First tell us what happened to
her.").
386

388

Id.

389
390

See id.
See id.
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Conclusion
Both Elizabeth Bouvia and Jahi McMath (through her family)
refused to follow social and medical expectations about how and
when to die. In the early 1980s, a California trial court expected
Bouvia to show heroism in submitting to a life with disabilities. 39 1 By
1986, expectations had changed with a change in social presumptions
as well as in court and judge: now, Bouvia gained the right to die and
her situation was understood to justify her preference for death over
life. 39 2 Almost no one involved in the case asked whether Bouvia was
depressed for reasons only indirectly connected to her disabilities and
whether that depression might have found relief in proper treatment.
Jahi McMath's family similarly defied expectations. The family
refused to agree to the withdrawal of ventilatory support. One
physician even contended that the family should accept Jahi's death
sooner rather than later so that her body would look good at her
funeral. 393 The Winkfield and McMath family insisted that Jahi had
not died despite the conclusions of her doctors and the provisions of
state law.
against 39 5-Bouvia reflected bias
Legal decisions for 394-and
against people with disabilities. These biases-in particular, that
disabled people could not thrive, could not live full, vibrant lives, and
should, instead, be pitied-were deeply ingrained in the society.
Bouvia's legal cases and the stories that surrounded them and that
followed in their wake brought some of those biases to light. These
stories were used by the fledgling disability rights movement to frame
social biases against people with disabilities and the implications of
those biases.
Courts' responses to cases initiated by Jahi's family were more
circumspect, revealing less about the judges' perspectives than was
true of court responses to Bouvia's claims. 396 Yet, for McMath, as for
See Bouvia I, supra note 22, at 491.
Bouvia, 179 Cal. App.3d, at 1144.
393 See Aviv, supra note 137 (noting disclaimer).
394 See Bouvia, 179 Cal. App.3d, at 1144.
395 See Bouvia I, supranote 22, at 491.
396 To some extent, the express appearance of bias in Bouvia's case reflects social
presumptions at the time. The courts, the lawyers-Bouvia herself-did not seem to understand
391

392
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Bouvia, bias was part of the underlying story. Whether clinicians and
hospital administrators' treatment of Jahi and of her family were
grounded in bias and prejudice is not clear from available reports but
is suggested by some of those reports. 3 9 7
Ironically, Bouvia, herself, did not perceive what others saw as bias,
while McMath's family perceived bias when others did not seem to
recognize it. At least some clinicians and/or attorneys who should have
cared for these patients/litigants seem, instead, to have responded to
them through lenses colored by social biases. Many of their reported
responses were callous, unthoughtful, and, for McMath's family, at

least, profoundly painful. 3 98
Had these cases not invoked complicated social debates about
death and dying, the two stories-that of Bouvia and that of
McMath-might not have been told in public settings. Had they not
involved two compelling patients, they also might have been less
compelling to the public and received less attention or stimulated
fewer responses. That they were widely considered and reported has
helped society clarify its understandings of death or dying, while
raising new and challenging questions about autonomy, community,
and bias. Indeed, each story has identified deeply ingrained biases
and, arguably, more explicit prejudice in medical and legal settings.
Through these stories, even as they are uneven and often
contradictory, society has been encouraged to make sense of social
responses to the issues occasioned by the Bouvia and McMath stories
and to contemplate whether and how to re-shape its responses. More
specifically, challenges occasioned by the stories of Elizabeth Bouvia
and Jahi McMath have pushed society more carefully to consider the
shape of death and the force of bias in medical and legal deliberations.

that their view of disabled people was grounded in bias, even if that bias is transparent from a
contemporary perspective.
397
See, e.g., Aviv, supra note 137; Wilson, supra note 332; Goodwin, supra note 303.
398 See Wilson, supra note 332.

